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FOREWORD 
This monograph was written as part of a comparative study of Rural
 
Local Government organized by the Rural Development Committee of Cornell
 
University. The study aimed at clarifying the role of rural local institu­
tions in the rural development process, with special reference to agricul­
tural productivity, income, local participation and rural %,elfare. An
 
interdisciplinary working group set up under the Rural Development Committee
 
established a comparative framework for research and analysis of these 
relationships. 1 A series of monographs, basel in most cases on original
 
field research, has been written by members of the working group and by 
scholars at other institutions and has been published by the Rural Develop­
ment Committee. An analysis and sunuary of the study's findings has been
 
written for the working group by Norman Uphoff and Milton Esman and has
 
been published separately.
 
This study of Rural Local Government is part of the overall program
 
of teaching and researzh by members of the Rural Development Committee,
 
which functions under the auspices of the Center for International Studies
 
at Cornell and is chaired by Norman Uphoff. The main focuses of Committee
 
concern are alternative strategies and institutions for promoting rural
 
development, especially with respect to the situation of small farmers,
 
rural laborers and their families. This particular study was financed in 
large part by a grant from the Asia Bureau of the U.S. Agency for Interna­
tional Development. The views expressed by participating scholars in this 
study are their own and do not necessarily reflect the viws or policies 
of USAID or Cornell University. 
Special Series on Rural Local Government
 
1. 	TIHE ELUSIVENESS OF EQUITY: INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES TO RURAL DEVELOP-

MENT IN BANGLADESH, by Harry W. Blair, Department of Political Science,
 
Bucknell University, and Visiting Fellow, Rural Development Committee,
 
Cornell, 1972-73.
 
2. 	PEOPLE'S COrIUNI:S AIND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA, by Benedict Stavis, 
China-Japan Program and Rural Development Committee, Cornell. 
3. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND EGYPTIAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT, by James B. Mayfield, 
Department of Political Science, University of Utah, Salt Lake City.
 
PANCIIAYATI %,NJAND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN ANDIIRA PRADESII, INDIA, by 
G. Ram Reddy, Department of Political Science, Osmania University,
 
lyderabad, India.
 
5. 	TIlE DYNAM.IICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CI[ANGE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN PUNJAB, 
INDIA, by S.S. Johl, Department of Economics and Sociology, Punjab 
'The members of the working group were Ron Aqua, Douglas Ashford, 
John Jllackton, Harry Blair, Milton Esman, Mohinder Mudahar, Norman 
Nicholson, David Robinson, Benedict Stavis, and Norman Uphoff. 
and 	 ohinder S. Mudahar,Ludhiana, India,Agricultural University, 
Department of Agricultural Economics, Cornell.
 
DECISION-AKING IN RAJASTHAN,RURAL 	 ELECTRIFICATION AND DECENTRALIZED6. 	
INDIA, by Susan G. Hadden, Department of Political Science, Oakland 
University. 
RURAL 	LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN JAVA, 
INDONESIA,

7. 

'by Gary E. Hansen, East-West Technology and Development Institute,
 
University of Hawaii. 
8. 	LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN JAPAN, by Ronald 
Aqua,
 
Department of Government, Cornell.
 
9. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN MALAYSIA, by Stephen 
Chee, 
Faculty of Economics and Administration, University of Malaya.
 
BASIC DEMOCRACIES AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN PAKISTAN, by Norman 
K.
 
10. 

Nicholson, Department of Political Science, Northern Illinois Univer­
sity, 	and Visiting Professor, Department of Government, Cornell,
 
1972-73; and Dilawar Ali Khan, Department of Cooperation and Credit,
 
Pakistan Agricultural University, Lyallpur.
 
byGROWTH AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN PUNJAB, PAKISTAN,11. 	 AGRICULTURAL 
S. Javed Burki, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
 
AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PHILIPPINES, by Santiago12. 	 LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
d Arturo G. Pacho, College of Public
S. Simpas, Ledivina Carino, 

Administration, University of the Philippines.'
 
13. 	 LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA, by Ronald
 
Aqua, Department of Government, Cornell.
 
14. 	 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SRI LANKA, by John S. 
Blackton, Department of Government, Cornell. 
15. 	 RURAL LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN, by 
Benedict Stavis, China-Japan Program and Rural Development Com­
mittee, Cornell.
 
16. 	 LOCAL GOVERNANCE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN THAILAND, by Marcus Ingle, 
Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
 
17. 	 LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN TURKEY, by Douglas 
E. Ashford, Department of Government, Cornell.
 
DEVELOPMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA, by Zdravko18. 	 LOCAL GOVERINFNT AND RURAL 

Mlinar, Department of Sociology, Political Science and Journalism,
 
University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia.
 
OF EXPER­19. 	 LOCAL ORGANIZATION FOR RURAL DEVELOPMENT: ANALYSIS ASIAN 
Milton J. Esman, Department ofIENCE, by Norman T. Uphoff and 
Government and Center for International Studies, Cornell.
 
TABLE OF 	CONTENTS
 
Page
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
 
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
 
PART I: 	Rural Governing Institutions and Rural
 
Development...... .................. . 3
 
A. 	 Introduction to Part I ...... . . . . 3
 
B. 	Local Administration--A Branch of
 
the Center ........ ................ 4
 
C. 	Agricultural Cooperatives... ........ .14
 
D. 	Rural Guidance and Extension Services . . 16
 
E. 	General Direction of Government Policy
 
vis-a-vis the Rural Sector .. ....... . 17
 
F. 	The Agricultural Sector in the Korean
 
Economy, 1962-71 .... ............. .20
 
G. 	Rural Income and Welfare ... ......... .28
 
PART II: 	Micro-Level Analysis of Local Government and
 
Rural Development in South Korea .. ....... .. 38
 
A.' 	Introduction to Part II.... .......... .38
 
B. 	The Areas Visited.... ............. ... 39
 
C. 	County Government.... ............. .. 41
 
D. 	 The County Agricultural Cooperative. . .. 51
 
E. 	The County Rural Guidance Office ..... 55
 
F. 	The Township Level ....... ........ .56
 
G. 	Neighborhood Associations (Hamlet) .... 58
 
H. 	Farmers' Response to Government
 
Initiative ...... ................ .. 61
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . ............. 	 . . . 66
 
LIST OF FIGURES
 
Figure Page
 
1 Organization of Local Administration
 
in South Korea .. .. .. ... ... . . 8
 
2 NACF Organizational Structure . . . . . . 15
 
3 Annual Average Farm Household Income,
1960-1971 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
 
4 	 County Organizational Structure ..... 42
 
5 	 Coordinating Linkages of County
 
Governments . . . . ............. 49
 
6 	 Organization Structure of County
 
Agricultural Cooperatives ........ 52
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table Page 
1 Comparison of Local Finance (Settled 
Revenues) with National Finance 
(Settled Revenues) by Year............ . 9 
2 Comparison of Local Tax Revenues with 
National Tax Revenues by Year (in 
millions of won).... .............. 10 
3 Self-Reliance of General Account of 
Local Government by Year (in percentage). 11 
4 Percentage of Total Per Farm Household 
Income Derived from Agriculture ..... 12 
5 Farm Population and Size of Farm 
Household ........... . .......... 21 
6 Composition of GNP by Industrial Group,1962-71 . . . . . . . . . . . .. 22 
7 Major Indicators on GNP ... ........ . . 23 
8 Per Capita Rice and Total Agricultural 
Production and Per Capita Planted Area 
for Rice, 1955-70 .... ............ . 25 
9 
10 
Index of Number of Agricultural and 
Forestry Production . . ......... 
Agricultural Production (Yields in kg 
. . 26 
per Hectare) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 
11 Indicators of Agricultural Productivity . 29 
12 Index Numbers of Productive Basis and 
Trends of Assets of Agriculture . . . . . 30 
13 Consumption Expenditures Per Household 
by Spending Categories... ........ . . 32 
Page
Tabls 

14 Income and Expenditures Per Farm
 
. . 33
Household . . . . . . . . . . .*. . . 
Index Numbers o2 Prices Received and15 

Paid by Farmers. . . . . . . . . . ... 34 
16 Farm Household by Percentage of Rented 
Land in Total Cultivated Area . . . . . . 35 
17 Demographic Data for Areas Visited in 
Field Research. . . . . . . . . . .  . 40 
18 Number of Farm Households by Size of 
Farm: Land Under Cultivation, 1971 . . . 41 
19 Summary of Settled Accounts, 1972 .... 45 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
 
Millions of Americans have set foot on Korean soil
 
for many different reasons, and yet Americans as a people
know surprisingly little about that volatile and crowded
 
peninsula. As one who wpnt to Korea for a tour of duty in
 
the Peace Corps in 1970, only to depart after eighteen

months with most of the pieces of the Korean puzzle still
 jumbled in my mind, I welcomed the opportunity to return
 
again in 1973 under 
the auspices of the Rural Development

Committee of Cornell University in connection with its
 
comparative study of rural local government.
 
While in Korea, I had the opportunity to meet and
 
exchange ideas with many students and scholars at the
 
Seoul National University Graduate School of Public Admin­
istration, and they gave freely of their time and displayed

considerable patience in the face of niy persistent questioning.

In particular, Mr. Kim Chong-cho led me through the bureau­
cratic maze of the national ministries and helped me acquire

a considerable colleccion of statistics and other published

materials. Mr. Park Key-young served as 
a loyal research
 
assistant through several weeks of field research in the
 
Korean countryside, and was as knowledgeable about farming

and farmers as about administration and administrators 
(a

combination of assets that I found exceedingly rare in one
 
person). Dr. Chung Kun-mo generously allowed me the use of
his office at the Korean Advanced Institute of Science and
 
his staff rendered much courteous service.
 
Back at Cornell, I have benefited greatly from the
 
comments and suggestions provided for an earlier draft of
 
this paper by members of the Working Group on Rural Local
 
Government, as well as from the stimulation provided by a
 
workshop on Korean local government that had three notable
 
students of Korean affairs among its participants: Vincent
 
Brandt, Kang Pyung-kun, and Princeton Lyman. Norman Uphoff

the Working Group's chairman, has proved to be a stern and
 
dedicated taskmaster.
 
My wife Maeja, who was born in a tiny Korean village

that even today lacks electricity or an all-weather road,
 
was and is my best informant on Korea and its rural people.

During our field research, she proved to be the most capable

interviewer and interpreter of what was going on around us,

and frequently steered me 
away from hasty or ill-founded
 
observaLions..
 
Ultimately, of course, I alone must accept respon­
sibility for the format, tone, and conclusions of this
 
study. I accept that responsibility with the added burden
 
of knowing that many South Korean farmers and public
 
officials regarded me as a unique medium for them to
 
express their daily concerns to a larger, unknown audience.
 
I hope I have merited their trust and confidence.
 
Ronald Aqua
 
Cornell University
 
INTRODUCTION
 
The decade of the nineteen-sixties was a period

of unprecedented economic growth in South Korea, as
 
President Park Chung Hee offered the Korean people the
 
prospect of rapid industrialization and modernization
 
within the context of maintaining a strong national
 
defense and relative political stability. Significant

American and, after 1965, Japanese commitments, both
 
official and private, served to bolster this prospect,

and Koreans experienced a new sense of national self­
confidence and pride as they pointed to large annual
 
increases in their Gross National Product.
 
While industrialization proceeded apace with the
 
infusion of large amounts of foreign capital, the agri­
cultural sector witnessed much smaller and more irregular

gains by contrast. The disparity between industrial and
 
agricultural growth was exacerbated by heavy concentration
 
on infrastructural improvements within and between major

urban industrial and commercial centers at tne expense of
 
the rural areas of the nation. That so many rural inhabi­
tants moved to the Wities in increasing numbers indicated
 
their growing awareness of the fact that urban workers
 
were more likely than they to share in the fruits of
 
modernization. Thi:;, 
 in turn, placed great strains both
 
on new areas of urban concentration and on the supply of
 
labor available for intensive cultivation of important
 
grain crops.
 
By the end of the nineteen-sixties the South Korean
 
government began to undertake a serious reconsideration of
 
the economic and social consequences of unbalanced growth.

One major outcome of this re-evaluation process was the
 
implementation of a rural mobilization campaign aimed at
 
enhancing rural living standards while fostering a spirit

of cooperation and self-help within rural settlements.
 
This New Community Movement, begun in 1971, was very much
 
alive in the 
summer of 1973 when I conducted the field
 
work for the present study, and all the agencies that are
 
involved in the day-to-day administration of programs
 
concerned with rural development were busily engaged in
 
carrying out New Community Movement tasks.
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Thus, while industrialization still maintains
 
its predominant position among the developmental objectives

of the South Korean government, the problems facing the
 
rural areas have come increasingly to the fore and the
 
government has begun to respond. 
The scale and durability

of this response remain to be seen, but certainly the
 
initial impact of recent policies ought to be evaluated
 in terms of the stress they have placed upon an already

overburdened and underfinanced local administrative
 
apparatus and upon the individual farmers who have become
 
directly and personally involved in New Community Movement
 
activities. 
One serious obstacle to this kind of evaluation
 
has been the lack of any systematic treatment of either
 
central-local relations in the Korean administrative
 
context or citizen-government relations in rural areas.
 
This study is primarily concerned with the general

issue of what role local governmental agencies have played

in rural development in South Korea and will not attempt
 
a systematic consideration ofleither central-local or
 
government-citizen relations. 
 Both of these topics are
 
germane to our more general analysis, however, and will
 
receive some attention within a broader context. 
The
 
approach will be largely descriptive, and while some
 
provocative conclusions will be suggested, the author
 
must emphasize the limited scope of his field work and
 
the fact that any study of a nation that is undergoing

rapid social and economic change cannot avoid the limita­
tinns of a restricted time frame of analysis.
 
The study is divided into two parts. The first
 part will examine in aggregate terms the role that agri­
culture has played in the South Korean economy after first
 
setting down the major institutional arrangements for local
 
government and rural development in recent Korean history.

From this macro-level survey of rural local institutions
 
and rural development, the study will proceed to examine
 
the findings of a field trip to two rural counties. Based
 
on the micro-level analysis drawn from this field study,

some general conclusions concerning the role of local
 
governing institutions in rural development in South Korea
 
will be preqented.
 
1Neither will it attempt an assessment of the New Community

Movement as such since it is relatively new and no final
 
conclusions can be-drawn about it.
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PART I: 
RURAL GOVERN', 1, INSTITUTIONS AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
 
A. Introduction to Part I
 
At present almost all the organizations above the
 
hamlet (or "natural village") level that are in some way
 
involved in rural development in South Korea are govern­
mental or quasi-public agencies whose common structural
 
feature is a set of strong vertical linkages to higher­
level organizations which eventually culminate in central
 
organizations in Seoul. It is important to stress at the
 
outset that although this study is concerned with the
 
role of local government in rural development, South Korea
 
does not possess a local government system at all resembling
 
the conventional model of a popularly-elected council cum
 
executive body. There are, of course, offices at the
 
township (or village), county (or city), and provincial
 
(or special city) levels which conduct business that has
 
traditionally been associated elsewhere with "local
 
government," but these bodies are not directly responsible
 
to the people they serve. The public has no recourse
 
through elections or other institutional means of popular
 
control to influence local governmental policy.
 
It should also be pointed out that there is no
 
significant tradition in Korean history of powerful
 
"intermediate-range" groups such as memcantile guilds
 
or feudal fiefdoms which could have served as alternate
 
power centers to the national capital. "Centralization,"
 
as a singular theme through centuries of Korean history,
 
has been characterized in the following terms:
 
The society lacked clearly defined, separate units
 
to modify or control this central power. No different
 
races or cultures existed to confront each other with­
in it. Religious differences were insufficiently
 
concentrated in any broadly based local or social
 
group to permit the firm formation of cohesive
 
opposition or discrete interest. Exclusion of
 
foreign trade and the control and derogation of
 
commercial functions by the central bureaucracy
 
prevented the development of business classes, ports,
 
or specialization that could serve local strength.
 
Local institutions were weak and diffuse, local
 
administration offered no prestige, and ambitious
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young men s~w no use in associations and careers below
 
the center.
 
While certain religious movements succeeded in mobilizing
 
groups of people for shorter periods, and rural-based
 
learning centers fostered opposition to central dictates
 
among an isolated and alienated group of scholars, neither
 
these nor other locally-based institutions seemed to
 
provide the organizational capacity required to2affect
 
significantly the overall centralizing process.

B. Local Administration--A Branch of the Center
 
For centuries prior to the Japanese occupation of
 
Korea (1910-1945), rural villages and hamlets were left
 
largely to their own devices provided that order was
 
maintained, taxes paid, and corvee-labor performed.
 
Centrally-appointed magistrates dispensed justice and
 
relied heavily on local clerks to complete the routine
 
tasks of administering the tax laws and maintaining the
 
local records. The magistrates were subject to frequent
 
transfer as a means of preventing their accumulation of
 
political leverage in any one region, and the clerks were
 
so poorly treated and held in such low esteem by central
 
officials that they, too, were usually unable to build
 
local power bases (although they were occasionally
 
successful in accumulating small fortunes and considerable
 
land holdings based on their familiarity with tax laws
 
and control of local proper:y records).
 
The Japanese greatly altered this system during
 
their occupation of Korea, however, with the introduction
 
of elected local advisory councils, a limited suffrage
 
for certain groups of Koreans, and somewhat later, the
 
granting of very restricted legislative powers to the
 
local councils that previously had been only advisory
 
1Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics of the Vortex
 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 195-196.
 
2Henderson, pp. 26-29, 34-35.
 
3Henderson, pp. 47-49.
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I
 
bodies. But despite these innovations in the 1920's
 
and early 1930's, the Japanese Government-General still
 
retained strict central control over the appointment

and dismissal of local executives and closely supervised
 
all local governmental activities, exercisinq its veto
 
power when this was deemed necessary.
 
The administrative structure established by the
 
Japanese featured a four-tier system with the township
 
or incorporated village serving as the basic "local
 
autonomous unit," a designation that appears misleading
 
to outsiders considering the actual powers granted to
 
this unit. All activities conducted by the "local auto­
nomous unit" were transmitted down through two intervening

bureaucratic layers, the counties and the provinces, and
 
these activities were ultimately subject to the supervision

of the Department of Home Affairb.2 This four-tier structure
 
was adopted in practically unchanged form by the American
 
Occupation Government after World War II, and it closely
 
resembles the present structure in outward, if not internal,
 
organization.
 
Below this legal administrative structure was the
 
quasi-governmental neighborhood association (ri), a form
 
of social organization at the hamlet level whose earliest
 
known existence has beer traced back to 57 B.C. 3 This
 
historical structure '-s incorporated into the overall
 
governmental hierarchy by the Japanese as an important
 
administrative arm at the local level to facilitate the
 
recruitment and conscription of laborers for work projects

and soldiers for the Imperial Army. As' mobilization efforts
 
intensified in the late 1930's, the neighborhoods and even
 
smaller units served increasingly as devices for political

and social control, a system not unknown in Japan proper.
 
1Pyung-kun Kang, The Role of Local Government in Community
 
Development in Korea (University of Minnesota, unpublished
 
Ph.D. dissertation, 1966), pp. 78-92.
 
2Ibid.
 
3Chang-hyun Cho, "Bureaucracy and Local Government in South
 
Korea," in Se-jin Kim and Chang-hyun Cho, (eds.), Government
 
and Politics of Korea (Silver Springs, Md., the Research
 
Institute on Korean Affairs, 1972), p. 113.
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During the Japanese occupation, the position of the
 
average Korean farmer declined drastically. In part this
 
was due to a comprehensive Japanese land survey (1910-18),
 
after which a few unscrupulous Koreans who were educated
 
enough to understand the new land registration laws (many
 
were local clerks) joined with the incoming Japanese
 
settlers and the Japanese Government-General in depriving
 
many ignorant farmers of their land. Tenancy among Koreans
 
increased from1 37 7% in 1918 (after the land survey) to
 
53.8% by 1932.1
 
Several organizations were established by the Japanese
 
to provide rural credit and banking services, as well as
 
certain agricultural extension services, and these will
 
receive more attention in the next section. The establish­
ment of these centrally-inspired and centrally-directed
 
organizations no doubt. contributed to significant increases
 
in crop yields and to the diversification and scientific
 
upgrading of Korean agricultural practices during this period,
 
but the effect on the average Korean farmer seems to have 2
 
been minimal in terms of improving his standard 
of living.
 
In the early 1930's, the Japanese Governor-General,
 
Ugaki Isse, inaugurated one of the first serious rural
 
3
development schemes in modern Korean history. His plans
 
included the designation of model villages, the establish­
ment of Village Development Committees, provision for
 
training local leaders, and more generally, stressing the
 
role of local government in rural develppment. His scheme
 
was cut short, however, by the measures taken in 1937 and
 
thereafter to increase the pool of Korean manpower available
 
for Japanese factories and mines.
 
Following the end of the American occupation of Korea
 
and the termination of hostilities in the Korean peninsula
 
between the north and south, a new attempt was made to
 
establish elements of popular participation and electoral
 
responsibility at the local level of government. In 1952
 
local elections were conducted to select town councils which,
 
in turn, selected town executives (mayors). These local
 
councils could, by a 2/3 vote of no-confidence in a mayor's
 
policies, force his resignation.
 
1Henderson, p. 77.
 
2Hoon K. Lee, Land Utilization and Rural Economy in Korea
 
(Shanghai, Kelly and Walsh, Ltds., 1936), pp. 274-280.
 
3Kang, pp. 107-114.
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This system was amended several times during the
 
Syngman Rhee era, first to provide for the popular election
 
of the mayor and the elimination of the no-confidence
 
voting mechanism (1956), and later to revert from an
 
electoral selection process to an appointive one for the
 
mayor, a throwback to the earlier Japanese colonial regime.
 
After the overthrow of Syngman Rhee, the short-lived Chang
 
Myon government reinstated the original 1952 elective system
 
minus its no-confidence voting feature, but rapid changeover

in 1961 to a military government under Park Chung Hee brought
 
about substantial revisions that have remained in effect until
 
the present time.
 
Arguing that under the elective system local poli­
ticians were able to manipulate local resources to their
 
own advantage, that the local 'situation' had become over­
politicized, and that local factional disputes had become
 
intensified, Park ordered the "temporary" suspension of
 
electoral activities and town council meetings. Shortly
 
thereafter, the basic "local autonomous unit" was changed
 
from the town level, where it had been since Japanese
 
colonial days, to the kun (county) level, which, possessing
 
a larger resource base and a larger population than the
 
town, could allegedly overcome petty intra-village faction­
alism and escape the financial constraints that hampered
 
the smaller units. In addition, it was argued that a larger

electoral base would produce more highly-qualified leaders,
 
since competition would be more intense and the number of
 
available candidates much larger.l
 
The "temporary" suspension of elections and council
 
activities has proved to be enduring. Today, the conduct
 
of local government in South Korea more closely resembles
 
what it had been in the early days of the Japanese occupation
 
that at any time since the end of the Korean war.
 
The administrative hierarchy that governs local
 
administration is illustrated in Figure 1.
 
South Korea's two largest cities, Seoul and Pusan,
 
are under the direct supervision of the central government,
 
the former attached to the Prime Minister's office and the
 
latter operating more or less as a separate province. All
 
other local units lie within the jurisdiction of the Ministry
 
of Home Affairs, which exercises considerable authority in
 
most areas of governmental policy at the sub-national level.
 
The Ministry of Home Affairs has two bureaus, the Bureau of
 
Local Administration and the Bureau of Police; the former
 
iKang, pp. 155-157.
 
Figure 1: Organization of Local Administration in South Korea
 
President
 
Ministry of Home Affairs Other Functional 
I 
-=-Ministries 
Seoual ---- P an -­
------ Pusan Provinces (Do; N=9)

(Special City) (Direct-Control
 
city)

'* 
DistCi ies (Si; N=30) Counties (Kun; N=140) 
I I' 
Village Township
 
(Eup; N=91) (Myon; N=1382)
 
Ward (Dong) Neighborhood Association (Ri; N=36,020)
 
Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, Local Government in Korea (December,
 
1972), p. 17.
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is most directly involved in the day-to-day implementation
 
of local governmen policy, while the latter functions some­
what independently and is even more highly-centralized than
 
the local government system. Other central ministries also
 
exercise varying degrees of control ove. lower-level govern­
mental bodies within their respective functional areas.
 
Except for 1962, which was the year that Park Chung
 
Hee's military government was attempting to establish its
 
legitimacy before calling for a reversion to civilian rule,
 
the size of the local government sector in proportion to
 
the national sector, in terms of settled revenue accounts,
 
has held steady at roughly one-third of overall government
 
expenditure. This can be seen in Table 1 below:
 
Table 1: Comparison of Local Finance (Settled Revenues)
 
with National Finance (Settled Revenues), 1962-1971
 
(Real in millions of won; index: 1953=100)
 
Local (Real) as
 
National Local % of National (Real)
 
Index Real Index Real 
1962 2390 75550 1714 13701 18.1 
1963 1925 60844 2422 19358 31.8 
1964 1997 63151 2679 21552 34.1 
1965 3336 105481 3570 28526 27.0 
1966 4864 153777 5694 45500 29.5 
1967 6296 199018 7692 61465 30.8 
1968 8722 275717 9580 76549 27.7 
1969 11896 376041 15305 122293 32.5 
1970 14104 445856 18201 145430 32.6. 
1971 17568 555345 22483 179644 32.3 
Source: 	 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, Bureau of
 
Local Administration, Finance Abstract of Local Government,
 
1972, p. 436.
 
-10-

These figures can be somewhat misleading, however, since
 
during the same period local gove.'nments experienced a
 
shrinking tax base relative to national tax resources
 
while the demands placed on them for expenditures were
 
constantly increasing. This diminished local tax
 
capability is reflected in Table 2.
 
Table 2: Comparison of Local Tax Revenues with
 
National Tax Revenues by Year (in
 
millions of won)
 
Local as % 
National Local of National 
1962 28242 5215 18.4 
1963 30303 7404 24.4 
1964 36563 8800 24.1 
1965 54634 11359 20.7 
1966 87646 16131 18.4 
1967 129241 14070 10.8 
1968 156407 19305 12.3 
1969 262823 26511 10.0 
1970 334723 29480 8.8 
1971 423998 39813 9.3 
Source: 	 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, Bureau
 
of Local Administration, Financial Abstract of Local
 
Government, 1972, p. 436.
 
As the financial plight of local governments progressively

worsened, most of them looked to the center for supplementary

funds to sustain at least minimum development efforts. The
 
major exceptions to this general trend have been the two
 
largest metropolitan areas, Seoul and Pusan, which have
 
managed to remain at a relatively high level of fiscal self­
sufficiency (Table 3).
 
If growing financial dependence on the center is any

indication of diminishing local control over governmental

affairs, then clearly the South Korean case provides one more
 
example of a political system in which local units relinquish

effective program control to higher levels because of their
 
inability to underwrite the additional social overhead costs
 
placed upon them by a modernizing central elite.
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Table 3: Self-Reliance of General Account of Local
 
Government by Year (in percentage)
 
All Local Units Provinces Seoul Pusan
 
1965 51.7% 	 44.1% 96.4% 90.2%
 
1966 48.1% 	 35.8% 97.5% 89.6%
 
1967 35.7% 	 25.9% 76.1% 64.4%
 
1968 39.5% 	 26.7% 83.7% 71.6%
 
1969 42.6% 	 31.8% 88.7% 68.5%
 
1970 38.5% 	 25.1% 90.2% 63.7%
 
1971 37.1% 	 23.6% 89.7% 64.3%
 
1972 49.2% 	 19.6% 91.7% 71.4%
 
Source: 	 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, Bureau
 
of Local Administration, Financial Abstract of Local
 
Government, 1972, pp. 464-465.
 
Since in the second part of this study we will
 
be concerned with the role of local government in rural
 
development, it would be useful to specify which level
 
of the system we have just described will constitute
 
rural local government. Seoul and Pusan, the two major
 
metropolitan areas of South Korea, can be excluded at the
 
outset, along with cities (generally having populations 
above 50,000) and most villages (with 20,000 to 50,000
 
population and mixed service, commercial, and agricultural 
activities) . Except for these, most governmental units 
at the county leve] and below are situated in areas largely 
engaged in agricultural production, and these will be the 
focal point of our study. Unlike TaJwan and Japan, where 
a third or more of rural household income is often derived 
from non-agricultural sources and many rural areas have 
taken on 	a mixed agricultural-industrial character,1
 
iSee Tadashi Fukutake, Japanese Rural Society (Ithaca,
 
Cornell University Press), 1972, pp. 24-25 for figures
 
on Japan, and Benedict Stavis, Rural Local Governance
 
and Agricultural Development inTTan (fthaca, Center
 
for ]ntcrnational Studies, Rural Development Committee,
 
1974),Figure 5.
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South Korean farmers generally derive four-fifths or
 
more of their income from agriculture and are only
 
marginally involved in fishing, handicrafts, or
 
small-scale industries as secondary occupations.
 
This is reflected in Table 4.
 
Table 4: Percentage of Total Per Farm Household
 
Income Derived from Agriculture
 
1962 	 73.6%
 
1963 	 75.8%
 
1964 	 81.0%
 
1965 	 76.6%
 
1966 	 77.2%
 
1967 	 77.1%
 
1968 	 77.3%
 
1969 	 77.9%
 
1970 	 78.2%
 
1971 	 81.9%
 
Source: 	 Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board,
 
Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1972, p. 144.
 
Significantly, there seems to be no recent trend toward
 
growing reliance on outside income sources to supplement

agricultural income, although some government programs
 
have stressed "diversification of industry" in the
 
countryside.
 
The main transmission link between the local
 
levels with which we will be concerned and the central
 
ministries is the province. The pivotal position 3f this
 
intermediate layer of m-di--Tnistration predates even the
 
Japanese reorganization of local government. The province
 
has no real autonomous functions, and its system of personnel
 
recruitment, budgeting, planning, and other bureaucratic
 
functions comes under the direct tutelage of the Ministry

of Home Affairs. The highest-ranking provincial executives 
are usually appointed-from the ranks of career civil
 
servants in the Ministry of Home Affairs or from high

provincial-level positions.
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While the actual day-to-day operations of the

"local autonomous unit" (the county) and the township

level below it will be discussed in considerable detail
 in Part II, 
let us first enumerate here the officially­
prescribed functions of these levels. 
 The South :'orean
 
government divides the activities of local government

into three groups, as follows:l
 
1. Autonomous affairs: 
 including organization

and administrative affairs, affairs pertaining to the
 
promotion of welfare projects for citizens 
(public works,

city planning, public utilities, sanitation, hospitals

and other public facilities), and affairs concerning

education, arts, and culture.
 
2. 
Affairs assigned to local autonomous bodies
 
by the state: including highway maintenance, prevention

of communicable diseases, employment programs, tax
 
collection, product inspection, sanitary inspection, and
 
protection of youth and the mentally deranged.
 
3. Affairs assigned to executive organs by the
 
state: including economic planning, flood and erosion
 
control, farm development and reform, promotion of local
 industry, personal registration matters, presidential

and national assembly elections, maintenance and control

of rivers and streams, and affairs of the central govern­
ment's departments which are disposed of within local
 
autonomous bodies.
 
In practice, the overwhelming number of activities
 
performed by "local autonomous bodies" are initiated and

closely supervised by national ministries, and the tri­partite functional separation of local affairs is meaningful

only is a legalistic sense.
 
In the area of taxation, local governments execute
 
nationally-defined tax laws and serve as principal collection
 
agents for the other administrative levels. Through a

complicated allocative procedure, local authorities collect

eight kinds of "ordinary taxes" (sub-divided into provir.ial­
level and city/county-level taxes) and two "special-purpose

taxes." 
 Only a small portion of these revenues are retained
 
by the local unit that collects them; most funds are sent to
higher levels whence some-portion is returned to the lccal
 governments in the form of grants and subsidies. 2
 
1Republic of Korea, Ministry of Home Affairs, Local Govern­
ment in Korea (Seoul, Ministry of Home Affairs; 1972),
 
pp. 41-45.
 
2Ibid, pp. 69-75.
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By the end of 1971, there were 74,000 public
 
officials at the "local autonomous" level. Of these,
 
approximately 18% were nationally-appointed (usually
 
the highest-ranking bureau and section chiefs), and
 
the rest locally-appointed but subjyct to central
 
personnel policies and supervision. A critical
 
feature of central control over local affairs throughout

centuries of Korean history has been the center's domin­
ation of the examination, appointment, transfer, promotion,
 
evaluation, and dismissal of personnel at all levels. The
 
central-local distinction in personnel systems pertains
 
more to salary grades and prestige factors than to any 2
 
real difference in central domination of either system.
 
The "local autonomous body," the county, is the
 
main coordinating agency at the local level for several
 
other governmental organizations. Among these, the two
 
that are most directly concerned with rural development

efforts are the cooperatives and the Rural Guidance
 
Offices. The background and operation of these two
 
agencies will be described in the following sections.
 
C. Agricultural Cooperatives
 
Althouqh Korean farmers have traditionally
 
organized themselves in cooperative societies for
 
communal labor and mutual financial aid (kye), national
 
centrally-directed organizations to serve the farmers'
 
needs were first established under the Japanese. After
 
the Korean War, separate agencies to provide credit and
 
conduct agricultural business activities were reorganized
 
several times. In August, 1961, the two main bodies,
 
the Agricultural Banks and the Agricultural Cooperatives,
 
were merged to form the National Agricultural Cooperative

Federation (NACF). The organization structure of the NACF
 
is shown in Figure 2.
 
Primary cooperatives, formed by more than twenty
 
individual farmers who must each purchase at least one
 
and not more than 300 shares of stock valued at 1000 won
 
per share, operate at the township level. There is currently
 
an average of 1,400 farmers in each primary unit due to a
 
merger movement that has been going on for several years.
 
1Ibid.,p. 59.
 
2Very recent changes in the local personnel system do not
 
alter this general observation. See The Korea Herald,
 
May 5, 1974, p. 3.
 
From 1962 to 1971, the number of primary cooperatives­
declined 	from 21,518 to 4,512, and this had dropped
 
even further, to 1,567, by May, 19-73.
 
Figure 2: NACF Organizational Structure
 
National 	Agricultural Cooperative Federation
 
140 County Cooperatives
 
(203 Branch Offices)
 
148 Special Cooperatives
 
(51 Horticulture Coops)

(97 Livestock Coops)
 
1567 Primary Cooperatives
 
54,127 Member Farmers
 
2,208,489 Member Farmers
 
Source: 	 National Agricultural Cooperative Federation,

Agricultural Cooperatives in Korea 
(May 1973),
 
p. 6.
 
Agricultural cooperatives at 
the local level are
highly integrated into the central NACF, which regulates

and supervises lower-level units and controls planning,

policy-making, and personnel affairs'at all levels. 
 Korean

cooperatives are multi-function agencies and are 
involved
in the following activities: purchase and sales of farm
production materials (including a monopoly on fertilizer
distribution, as well as competitive retailing of agro­
chemicals, farm implements and machinery, and feed stuffs);

sale of consumer goods and operation of non-profit chain
 
stores at the primary level (457 chain stores by the end
 
iNational Agricultural Cooperative Federation, Annual Report,
1971 (NACF, Seoul, Korea,.1972), 
39, and National AgricultUral

Cooperative Federation, Agricultural Cooperatives in Korea
 
(NACF, Seoul, Korea, 1973), p. 6.
 
of 1971); marketing and sales to UN military forces
 
and general marketing; foreign trade; utilization and
 
processing (including warehousing, transportation,
 
feed-mixing, and artificial insemination); credit and
 
banking (demand-deposit); mutual insurance, including
 
life insurance and crop damage insurance; farm guidance,
 
education and information; and management and marketing
 
research.' At the local level, primary cooperatives are
 
most directly involved in financial services, marketing
 
and purchasing, and sale, of production materials, while
 
the other functions are administered at higher levels.
 
Although primary cooperative financial services
 
are generally conducted through the utilization of locally­
generated financial resources, this by no means permits
 
the local units to operate independently of higher levels
 
in the system. In addition, both at the local and central
 
levels, coop activities are closely regulated and supervised
 
by central government ministries, particularly the Ministry
 
of Agriculture and Forestry and 'The Ministry of Finance,
 
and it is not uncommon at any level to have extensive
 
interaction between government officials and coop officials.
 
In no sense is the cocperative movement in South Korea a
 
locally-generated and locally-sustained voluntary effort.
 
It has all the trappings of centralization so frequently
 
alluded to throughout this study.
 
D. Rural Guidance and Extension Services
 
Again it is necessary to turn to the Japanese
 
occupation period to account for the origin of national
 
programs designed to enhance agricultural production
 
through the establishre-nt of research stations, extension
 
programs, and technical services related to the detection
 
of crop disease and other similar problems. LiLtle effort
 
was made to improve upon this colonial apparatus until
 
local offices of Agricultural Guidance were set up upon
 
the recommendation of an advisory team from the University
 
of Minnesota in 1957. Shortly thereafter, the government
 
established local Community Development Committees (1958)
 
and Agricultural Guidance Committees (1959) to coordinate
 
and promote rural extension services. These bodies were
 
replaced in 1962 by Farm-Village Development Committees
 
(deliberative bodies of local elites) and Offices of Farm-

Village Development (administrative bodies concerned more
 
2
directly with extension services).

1Ibid., pp. 8-18.
 
2Kang, pp. 213-216.
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At present, local extension services are conducted
 
mainly by Rural Guidance Offices (RGO), which are vertically

linked to the Office of Rural Development (ORD), a central
 
agency attached to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.

RGO's have witnessed a considerable expansion in the number
 
of activities of their personnel over the past decade, and
 
are currently involved in such programs as providing tech­
nical information and 	testing services to farmers, conducting

demonstration projects and model farms, and providing direction
 
and leadership for 4-F1 groups and Life Improvement Societies
 
for farmers and their 	wives.
 
County and township RGO's are linked horizontally

to their respective local government offices and technically
 
come under the legal jurisdiction of the county government.

Budgeting is conducted through the county government, but
 
personnel and overall 	policy direction is provide , as in
 
the case of the cooperatives, through the central agency,

in this case the ORD. 
More will be said of these various
 
intergovernmental relationships in the second part of the
 
study.
 
E. 	General Direction of Government Policy vis-'-vis the
 
Rural Sector
 
A fundamental restructuring of land-holding
 
patterns under the tutelage of American advisors around
 
the time of the Korean war resulted in the virtual
 
elimination of farms above three hectares in 
area (the

legal maximum limit under the land reform) and the wide­
spread appearance of extremely marginal owner-cultivators
 
having less than one hectare. "By 1957 an estimated 1.5
 
million farmers had acquired some 1.2 million acres of
 
land on which they had formerly been tenants or farm
 
workers...[Under a meager compensation scheme,] all but
 
the largest and most agile landowners were pauperized."1
 
This redistribution of wealth in the countryside

had important implications not only for a social structure
 
that had as one of its principal components a landlord
 
class, but also for methods of agricultural production.

The continued emphasis on individual small-holding

agriculture placed increased reliance on labor-intensive
 
cultivation techniques and served to de-emphasize mechan­ization and other related capital-intensive cultivating
 
practices.
 
1Henderson, p. 197.
 
Rural conditions stagnated through the 1950's,
 
and one of the first attempts by the Park Chung Hee
 
military government to alleviate this state of affairs
 
was the commencement in 1962 of a rural mobilization
 
campaign called the National Movement for Reconstruction.
 
This program was short-lived, however (it was allowed to
 
die in 1964). Although several 'false starts' were
 
attempted thereafter, the next significant program was
 
the New Community Movement, inaugurated in 1971.
 
According to an official government description,
 
the New Community Movement (Saemaul Undong) is "a popular,
 
self-help, and socio-economic reform movement initiated
 
voluntarily by the people in the 1970's with the ultimate
 
goal of modernization and peaceful unification of the
 
country."2 The primary objective of the Movement has
 
been to increase farmers' incomes through the introduction
 
of more modern techniques and the development of sources
 
of income besides crop cultivation (such as, for example,
 
livestock farming and local industries). In addition,
 
great emphasis has been placed on the improvement of
 
rural living conditions (including projects for the con­
struction and expansion of rural roads, replacement of
 
straw roofs with tile or slate, installation of water
 
supply systems and communal wells, construction or repair
 
of river banks and sewage systems, improvement of rural
 
kitchens and toilet facilities, local reforestation, and
 
the introduction of locally-generated methane gas supplies)
 
and "public spiritual ethos reform" to teach the value of
 
self-help and local cooperation. 3
 
Pespite pronouncements of government officials
 
to the contrary, one unmistakeable impression gained from
 
an examination of the abundance of organization charts,
 
administrative directives, and budget drafts emanating
 
from the national New Community Movement Coordinating
 
Committee is that the Movement is not a locally-initiated
 
and locally-directed project at all, but rather a nationally­
conceived and nationally-controlled effort. Saemaul
 
divisions, bureaus, and sections have been grafted onto
 
the bureaucratic structures at all levels in the three
 
organizations we have already discussed, and at least
 
iKang, pp. 332-341.
 
2Ministry of Home Affairs, op.cit., p. 108.
 
31bid., pp. 108-109.
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during the summer of .1973, the word Saemaul was not only

on the tips of all government officials' tongues, but
 
also adorned cigarette packages, tearoom signs, movie
 
theater facades, and consumer product brand names.
 
The Saemaul program divides villages into three1
categories based on pre-existing levels of development.

At the top are the "Self-Reliant Villages," (N=2100),

which prior to 1971 had already achieved most of the
 
basic aims of the Movement and are now involved in
 
refinements 
to their relatively high development level.
 
At the next lower level, "Self-ielp Villages" (N=14,500)
 
are involved in most of the projects listed above and

rely to a limited extent on supplementary governmental
assistance, which in part has taken the form of 300 bags

of cement and one-half ton of steel bars. 
At the lowest
 
level, the "Basic Villages" (N=18,500) engage in "required"

and "recommerided" projects 
(the former involving widening

of roads, dike construction, sanitation facilities, and
 
common laundering facilities; the latter, construction
 
of certain public welfare facilities and other "income­
enhancing" projects), with basic governmental assistance
 
coming in the 
form of 500 bags of cement and one ton of

steel bars per village. Villagers are expected to organize

their own Saemaul plans, hold community meetings to discuss

the plans, and donate generously of their time in imple­
menting these plan.s. In reality, at each stage of the
 
planning and implementation process, generous doses of
local official 'support' and 'advice' are rendered to
 
ensure fulfillment of developmental goals congruent with
 
higher-level e:.pectations.
 
The Movement was begun in earnest on a national

scale in 1971 after an initial experimental period with
 
several model villages. It received a financial boost

only very recently when the Japanese government announced
 
that its next annual aid package to the South Korean
 
government would include a significant allotment of funds
 
for the financing of rural development projects associated

with the New Community Movement.2 (One additional aspect

of the program that should be mentioned is that urban
 
areas as well as rural villages are participating in the
 
Movement and are involved in urban renewal and development

projects.)
 
1Saemaul Undong Chungang Hyop Oehoe, 73 Saemaul Undong Chonghap
 
Jichim, p. 5.
 
2Yomiuri Shimbun, November 3, 1973. 
. ,I 
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Although Saemaul permeates the Korean developmental
 
air these days, the South Korean government also has a
 
more general program designed to upgrade agricultural

production and improve rural incomes. For 1972, the first
 
year of the Third Five-Year Economic Development Plan, the
 
following policy objectives were to be implemented:
 
"1) Epochal increases in the production of the
 
Tongil high yield variety of rice, barley,

wheat, soybeans and sesame seeds in order to
 
lay the groundwork for a green revolution.
 
2) Steady promotion of the consumption of mixed
 
diets of rice and other cereals as well as
 
foods prepared from wheat flour as a means of
 
improving nutrition while conserving rice.
 
3) Implementation of a second phase of the special
 
program to increase rural income.
 
4) Comprehensive development of the basins of the
 
Han, Nakdong, Kum, and Youngsan rivers.
 
5) Vigorous pursuit of farm mechanization.
 
6) Large-scale reclamation of uplands.

7) Development of 'new villages' around model
 
farmers as the nuclei."1
 
More generally, the government is involved in the following

policies for agricultural development: development of
 
agricultural water resources, farmland repatterning,

improvement of fertilizer and pesticide application,

development of the livestock industry, increased production

of cash crops, increased sericultural productivity, develop­
ment of fisheries and forests, improved marketing systems,
 
export promotion and import discouragement, utilization of
 
seasonally-idled rural labor, and promotion of school­
industry cooperation.
 
The next section will take up the question of how
 
successful these government policies have been in promoting

rural development.
 
F. The Agricultural Sector in the Korean Economy, 1962-71
 
During the 1960's, the agricultural sector continued
 
to decline in relative importance in its coiiribution to
 
the Gross National Product of South Korea (see Table 6).

In terms of growth rates, the average annual rate for
 
1Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,

Agriculture in Korea, 1972, p. 29.
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agriculture during this period was 3.86%, as contrasted
 
with 17.24% for mining and manufacturing and 9.15% for
 
the economy as a whole (see Table 2). The percentage
 
of the total population living on farms declined by
 
almost 11 points, and the average number of persons
 
per farm household also dropped, as shown in Table 5.
 
Table 5: Farm Population and Size of Farm Household
 
% Farm Population of Farm Population per 
Total Population Household 
1962 57.1 6.11 
1963 56.2 6.33 
1964 55.6 6.35 
1965 55.2 6.31 
1966 54.0 6.21 
1967 53.5 6.22 
1968 51.7 6.17 
1969 49.6 6.12 
1970 45.9 5.80 
1971 46.2 5.93 
Source: 	 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and
 
Forestry, Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry
 
Statistics, 1972, p. 27.
 
A chronic problem of the agricultural sector has
 
been its continuing failure to meet the demand for basic
 
food grains from domestic production alone, necessitating
 
a reliance on food imports.1 The total amount of rice
 
production jumped from between 2 and 3 million metric
 
tons in the late 1950's to between 3 and 4 million metric
 
1In recent years, South Korea has been importing up to
 
one-fifth of its yearly supply of foodgrains. See Republic

of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Yearbook of
 
Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, 1972, p. 335.
 
Table 6: Composition of GNP by Industrial Group, 1962-71, in Percent
 (at 1970 Constant Market Prices)
 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Agricultural,
forestry, and 40.3 40.0 42.6 39.4 38.9 34.3 31.1 30.5 28.0 26.5 
fishery 
Mining and

.manufacturing 13.3 14.1 
 13.8 15.5 15.9 18.1 
 20.0 20.8 22.8 24.4
 
Social overhead
 
capital (1) 
 6.7 7.2 .7.6 8.5 9.1 10.0 11.7 13.1 13.3 13.0
 
Other services 39.7 38.7 36.0 
 36.6 36.1 37.6 37.2 
 35.6 35.9 36.1
 
(1) Includes construction, transportation, storage, communication, electricity, water,
 
and sanitary service.
 
Source: 
 The Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973, pp. 298-299.
 
Table 7: 
 Major Indicators on GNP
 
Growth Rate of GNP (1) 
1962 
3.1 
1963 
8.8 
1964 
8.6 
1965 
6.1 
1966 
12.4 
1967 
7.8 
1968 
12.6 
1969 
15.0 
1970 
7.9 
1971 
9.2 
Growth Rate ofper capita GNP (1) 0.2 5.8 5.6 3.3 9.6 5.3 10.1 13.9 6.0 7.4 
Growth Rate by 
industry 
Agriculture,forestry and 
fisheries 
-5.8 8.1 15.1 
-1.9 10.8 
-5.0 2.4 12.5 -0.9 3.3 
Mining andmanufacturing 14.1 15.7 6.9 18.7 15.6 21.6 24.8 19.9 18.2 16.9 
Other sectors 8.9 7.4 3.0 9.9 12.6 13.8 15.4 14.6 8.9 8-.9 
(1) Series at 1970 constant market prices.
 
Source: 
 The Bank of Korea, National Income Statistics Yearbook, 1972, pp. 176-177.
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tons in the late 1960's.1 Government programs to
 
introduce new high-yielding varieties, to increase the
 
application of chemical fertilizer and other production­
enhancing inputs, to reclaim additional land, and other
 
measures no doubt contributed to this overall increase
 
in production. But when population growth is taken into
 
account, much of the apparent progress is vitiated. As
 
Table 8 indicates, per capita rice production in 1970
 
was below that of 1955. In the same period, overall
 
agricultural production increased on a per capita basis
 
by a little over 6%, but even here, 1966 was a better
 
year than 1970. During the fifteen-year period,
 
population pressures on the land contributed to a
 
decreasing per capita area of land devoted to rice
 
cultivation.
 
Significant advances have been made in the
 
production of a number of cash crops, dairy products,
 
and silkworms, and this in turn has helped to increase
 
incomes of rural households. Some overall production
 
trends are shown in Table 9. Less impressive has been
 
the effort to increase productivity in terms of yields
 
per unit of land. As seen from Table 10, progress for
 
most major crops has been halting at best. Furthermore,
 
several nonetary indicators of agricultural productivity
 
show that the gains have been uneven, with some improve­
ment in labor productivity but little or no change in
 
land productivity and little change in capital intensity
 
for agricultural (Table 11). Table 12 summarizes some
 
basic trends of production assets which further strengthen
 
the conclusion that despite substantial new inputs of
 
power tillers, fertilizer, insecticides, and pumps over
 
the past decade, the gains for rice production and other
 
basic grains have been basically unimpressive.
 
1For source, see gable 8.
 
Table 8: Per Capita Rice and Total Agricultural Production 
and Per Capita Planted Area for Rice, 1955-70 
P/C Rice Production 
(metric tons) 
P/C Total Agricultural 
Production (mt) 
P/C Planted Area 
in Rice (hectares) 
1955 
1960 
1966 
1970 
.137 
.122 
.134 
.125 
.224 
.211 
.259 
.238 
.051 
.045 
.043 
.039 
1 
1 
Source: Computed from Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board, Korea 
Statistical Yearbook, 1972, p. 40 and Republic of Korea, Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry, Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry
Statistics, 1972, p. 134. 
Table 9: Index Number of Agricultural and Forestry-Production
 
(1964-66=100)
 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971. 
Rice 79.5 99.1 104.3 92.3 103.4 95.0 84.3 107.9 103.9 101.3 
Barley 81.6 61.9 95.2 101.1 103.7 99.0 89.4 97.4 87.1 78.9 
Soybeans 93.7 94.1 98.0 105.0 97.0 121.2 147.6 137.8 139.6 133.8 
Fruits and 
vegetables 67.9 66.6 89.7 90.3 120.0 127.9 155.9 134.0 125.6 156.2 
Livestock 88.8 106.0 111.4 93.0 95.6 101.9 93.2 130.5 126.7 116.6 
Milk 19.6 44.7 71.8 108.6 119.5 196.6 248.9 363.3 531%5 669.0 
Cocoons 71.3 79.7 75.7 100..4 124.1 140.9 214.8 267.6 276.6 319.1 
Timber 59.4 80.6 84.2 85.9 129.9 135.0 139.2 186.8 142.1 149.1 
Mushrooms 134.8 118.1 120.9 81.3 97.8 115.0 205.7 236.7 289.1 268.6 
Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Yearbook of Agriculture
 
and Forestry Statistics, 1972, pp. 432-437.
 
Table 10: Agricultural Production (Yields in kg Per Hectare)
 
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Rice 2652 3257 3307 2853 3186 2914 2773 3358 3277 3358 
Barley, 1684 1109 1674 1775 2087 1976 2128 2218 2188 2228 
Soybeans 544 555 575 565 585 645 786 746 786 807 
Fruits 8500 7562 8066 7290 7391 7522 7724 7542 7088 7371 
Vegetables 10577 9912 10406 10547 11232 10638 11253 10819 9992 11434 
Source: 
 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Yearbook of Agriculture

and Forestry Statistics, 1972, pp. 134-135, 180, 224, 226. 
 Figures have been
 
converted from Korean units.
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G. Rural Income and Welfare
 
According to South Korea's Ministry of Agriculture
 
and Forestry, farm income per household "has grown 2.5 times
 
between 1965 and 1970,1l but the figures used by the Ministry
 
in their calculation failed to reflect increased living costs
 
brought about through inflation. When adjusted for rising
 
price levels, a very different picture emerges, as shown in
 
Figure 3. The real gain between 1960 and 1971 was 45.5%,
 
with considerable fluctuation in the intervening years.
 
Only in the past few years has the curve consistently gone
 
upward, but it is difficult to project whether this trend
 
will continue.
 
The ratio of rural-to-urban income for the average
 
household in the respective sectors was 99.7% in 1965 but
 
fell to 60.1% only two years later.2 In the years since
 
1967, this gap has narrowed somewhat as farmers received
 
higher prices for their production, but the urban areas
 
still contain the prospect of a higher income and better
 
living conditions for the average rural inhabitant. In
 
1971, rural households were paying about 6% more out of
 
their overall consumption expenditures for food purchases
 
than urban households, although somewhat lesser shares for
 
housing and clothing (Table 13).
 
Perhaps the largest single constraint on rural incomes
 
has been the average size of land holdings. Although there is
 
at present a tendency away from the smallest family holdings,
 
as marginal farmers move to the urban areas, the bulk of the
 
farmland under cultivation is still farmed by households
 
owning a hectare or less of land. In 1971, almost one-thiid
 
of all farm households held plots less than 0.5 hectare in
 
area; another third held between 0.5 and 1.0 hectare; and
 
only six percent held more than 2.0 hectares. In the same
 
year, the average income per farm household for those holding
 
less than 0.5 hectare was W240,481 (approximately U.S. $650 at
 
the June 1971 exchange rate); for those holding between 0.5
 
and 1.0 hectare, W350,891 (U.S. $948); and proportionately 3
 
higher incomes for households holding more tiian 1.0 hectare.
 
Of course, households with larger land holdings usually have
 
more people per household and this somewhat offsets the
 
lower income figures. The fact remains, Lowever, that the
 
extremely small plots cultivated by two-thirds of all rural
 
households severely limit the income-enhancing capacity of
 
these people.
 
1Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
 
Agriculture in Korea, 1972, p. 16.
 
2Ibid.
 
3Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry,
 
Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry in Korea, 1972,
 
pp. 48-49, 292-295.
 
Table 11: Indicators of Agricultural Productivity
 
(in 1970 constant prices)
 
Land Labor Capital
 
Productivity (1) % Change Productivity (2) % Change Intensity (3) % Change
 
1961 3419089/tanbo W 66.98/hr. 	 1432013/tanbo
 
1963 1424173 +26.6% 14104.42 +55.9% 1437960 +18.6%
 
1964 1425475 + 5.4% 14109.41 + 4.8% W25220 -33.6%
 
1965 1417878 -29.8% W 82.17 -24.9% 1416070 -36.3%
 
1966 W18416 + 3.0% W 84.58 + 2.9% W22972 +42.9% 
1967 W18137 - 1.5% 1 87.72 + 3.7% 1422835 - 0.6% 
1968 1417395 + 4.1% 1 92.28 + 5.2% 123102 + 1.2% 
1969 1419332 +11.1% W104.43 +13.2% 1426229 +13.5%I 
1970 )419639 + 1.6% 107.18 	 + 2.6% 1426394 + 0.6%
 
1971 1425644 +30.6% W139.18 	 +29.9% W31638 +19.9%
 
(1) Agricultural income per household/Area of cultivated land per household.
 
(2) Labor hours of farming per household/Agricultural income per household.
 
(3) Agricultural capital per household/Area of cultivated land per household.
 
Source: 	 Republic cf Korea, Economic Planning Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1972,
 
pp. 144-145 (based on retail price index numbers of all farm supplies, household
 
goods, wages, and charges, from Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and
 
Forestry, Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, 1972, pp. 444-455).
 
One Tanbo = .099 Hectare 
U.S. "$.00 = 9310.75 (June 1970 exchange rate, from Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1972, p. 407). 
Table 12: Index Numbers of Productive Basis and
 
Trends of Assets of Agriculture
 
(1965=100)
 
1962" 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
 
Farm
 
household 98.5 96.4 97.7 100.0 101.3 103.2 102.9 101.6 99.2-. 99.0
 
Farm
 
population 95.5 96.6 98.3 100.0 99.8 101.7 100.,6 98.6 91.3 93.0
 
Farm pop.
 
per house­
hold 96.8 100.3 100.6 100.0 98.4 98.4 978 97.0 91.9 94.0
 
Cultivated,
 
land-paddy
 
area 96.5 99.2 100.4 100.0 98.8 97.3 97.5 98.3 93.6 99.4
 
Cultivated
 
land-upland 87.8 91.0 95.9 100.0 102.3 102.1 103.3 104.4 95.6 104.9
 
Fertilizer
 
consumption 15.2 88.2 92.6 •100.0 107.7 123.8 121.7 136-.0 143.2 153.9
 
Power
 
tillers 13.3 40.5 58.8 100.0 139.9 346.8 560.3 795.0 '1069.7 1515.9
 
Hand-power
 
insect
 
spray 55.1 83.6 94.2 100.0 489.2 136.3 201.0 299.9 382.1 "492.7
 
Power-driven
 
pumps 56.7 56.0 59.0 100.0 115.0 121.5 145.2 190.3 207.8 222.4
 
Source: 	 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Yearbook of Agriculture
 
and Forestry Statistics, 1972, pp. 424-429.
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Figure 3: Annual Average Farm Household Income, 1960-1971
 
(1970 constant prices)*
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*Dollar amounts are based on June 1970 exchange rate.
 
For source, see Table 11.
 
Source: 	 Computed from Republic of Korea, Economic Planning
 
Board, Korea Statistical Yearbook, 1972, pp. 147
 
and 248, and Research Department of the Bank of
 
Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1963, p. 276.
 
Times series price indexes for the 1960--71 period
 
are based on wholesale prices for major commodity
 
groups. Consistent time series indexes for retail
 
prices paid by farmers were not available for the
 
entire period. However, recomputation using some
 
of the available retail indexes revealed no major
 
deviation from the trend indicated above.
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Table 13: Consumption Expenditures Per Household
 
By Spending Categories
 
(percentage)
 
By Year Food Housing Fuel Clothing Misc.
 
Farm Households
 
1965 53.1% 3.8% 7.8% 8.0% 27.2%
 
1966 50.2 4.1 8.3 8.7 28.9
 
1967 49.1 4.0 8.0 9.0 30.0
 
1968 47.4 4.9 8.2 9.0 30.6
 
1969 46.4 4.3 8.1 9.0 32.1
 
1970 45.9 4.2 7.9 8.4 33.6
 
1971 47.4 4.2 8.0 7.6 32.8
 
Urban Households
 
1965 56.7 13.8 5..8 6.4 17.2
 
1966 48.5 17.9 6.2 7.7 19.6
 
1967 44.5 18.3 5.8 10.2 21.1
 
1968 42.4 17.2 5.2 10.8 24.4
 
1969 40.9 18.5 5.1 10.7 24.7
 
1970 40.5 18.4 5.5 10.1 25.6
 
1971 41.0 18.8 5.4 9.4 25.3
 
Source: 	 Republic of Korea, Economic Statistics Yearbook, 1973,
 
pp. 250-251.
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In the area of farm management, the ratio of

agricultural expenditures to agricultural receipts for all
farm households has held relatively constant during a
 
recent six-year period for which figures were available
(Table 14). Prices received by farmers for rice improved

considerably after 1968, while those for barley and wheat
fluctuated greatly in the early 1960's before making strong
gains in the late sixties (Table 15). The greatest price

advances were registered for cash crops after 1969.
price index for vegetables rose from 49.3 to 100.0 
The
 
(the
base accounting year) in 1969-70. 
 Given a trend among
Korean farmers to devote increasing acreage and effort to

cash-crop production, this sector of agricultural production

would seem to hold the greatest prospect of enhancing rural
incomes for the immediate future. 
 Such concentration of

energies in cash-cropping, however, will continue to exacerbate

the continuing shortage of basic food grains.
 
Table 14: Income and Expenditures per Farm Household
 
A. Agriculural 
Receipts 
B. Agricultural 
Expenditures B/A 
1966 131407 29977 22.8% 
1967 150995 34636 22.9% 
1968 177083 40147 22.7% 
1969 214617 47489 22.1% 
1970 248064 54027 21.8% 
1971 356567 64658 18.8% 
Source: Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board, Korea
Statistical Yearbook, 1972, pp. 158-159.
 
Table 15 also shows that prices paid by farmers for

clothing rose considerably faster than prices received by
farmers for rice in the mid-1960's. The same held true for
such other household necessities 
as building materials and
fuel for heating and lighting. Only after 1969 did prices

received by farmers for food grains and cash crops 
recover

sufficiently to offset rising prices for household goods.
Whether this trend will continue is difficult to project,
but a government commitment to hold down food prices for
 
Index Numbers of Prices Received and Paid by Farmers (1970=100)
Table 15: 

Rice 
1964 57.0 
1965 53.5 
1966 56.5 
1967 62.2 
1968 73.2 
1969 90.8 
1970 100.0 
1971 125.6 
Prices Received for 

Barley & Wheat 

84.3 

61,4 

58.1 

69.5 

75.9 

89.3 

100.0 

136.2 

Vegetables Clothing 
33.2 57.9 
40.1 66.1 
51.0 77.0 
43.2 85.7 
43.9 
49.3 
100.0 
96.3 
j 
I 
91.2 
95.5 
100.0 
102.3 
Prices Paid For
 
Housing Materials 

49.2 

53.6 

67.4 

75.5 

83.0 

88.9 

100.0 

112.4 

Light & Fu'el
 
49.8
 
57.4
 
69.2
 
81.9
 
85.9 w
 
90.9
 
100.0
 
i08.7
 
Source: Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Yearbook of Agriculture
 
and Forestry Statistics, 1972, pp. 444-447.
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Table 16: Farm Households in Chungcheong Nam Do, According to
 
Percentage of Rented Land in Total Cultivated Area, 1970
 
No. of Households % of Total 
Private Farm 
Househole.s 306,418 
Without Cultivated 
Land 7,904 2.6% 
Without any Rented 
Land 204,314 66.7% 
Less than 10% 34,050 11.1% 
10%-20% 10,268 3.4% 
20%-30% 10,477 3.4% 
30%-40% 8,998 2.9% 
40%-50% 7,504 2.4% 
50%-60% 7,199 2.3% 
60%-70% 5,640 1.8% 
70%-80% 4,673 1.5% 
80%-90% 3,573 1.2% 
More than 90% 1,818 0.6% 
Source: 	 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Agriculture and
 
Fisheries, Agricultural Census, 1970, No. 5
 
(Chungcheong Nam Do), pp. 196-197.
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urban workers, coupled with an inability to cope with a
 
worldwide inflationary spiral for petroleum-derived and
 
other products, could spell increasing financial diffi­
culties for Korean farmers.
 
While severe income restraints still persist in
 
the South Korean countryside, at least most farmers are
 
not subject to the burden of paying extravagant rents to
 
absentee landlords as they were in the days before World
 
War II. The land reform seems to have had a major impact
 
on reducing tenancy permanently. While accurate national
 
statistics are not readily available and while some would
 
argue that the tenancy figures are actually higher than
 
official government census figures indicate, in one province,
 
or
at least, the percentage of farm households renting 10% 

more of their land is reported to be only 19.5%. Of these,
 
the great bulk are renting less than 50% of the land they
 
cultivate. 66.7% of the households are reported to rent no
 
land at all (see Table 16).
 
Great strides have been made in providing at least
 
primary school facilities in rural areas, but access to
 
middle and high schools is often impeded by school fees
 
that are beyond the reach of many rural households or by
 
the necessity of having children remain employed on the
 
In 1971 there
farm after graduation from primary school. 

were 115 agricultural high schools with almost 40,000
 
students. Roughly 30% of the graduates from these schools
 
eventually return to farming.1
 
Most county seats now have public health centers
 
which provide such services as tuberculosis clinics and
 
vaccinations, but many townships are still without the
 
In 1971, 36.3% of the townships
services of a physician. 

(containing 27.3% of South Korea's total population) did
 
not have a physician; 90.4% did not have dentists, and
 
72.2% lacked herb-doctors. 
2
 
1Korean Agricultural Sector Study Team 1972 (George E.
 
Rossmiller, Field Project Director and Glenn L. Johnson,
 
Project Director), Korean Agricultural Sector Analysis
 
and Recommended Development Strategies, 1971-1985 (here­
after referred to as KASS) (Seoul, Korea and East Lansing,
 
Michigan, 1973), pp. 27-28.
 
2Republic of Korea, Ministry of Health and Social Affairs,
 
Yearbook of Public Health and Social Statistics, 1971,
 
pp. 178-179.
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Nutrition levels have improved somewhat in recent
 
years, but in the more isolated areas food supplies are
 
sometimes meager and fresh vegetables and fruits often a
 
luxury. Cereals comprise about half of the total food
 
intake of the average Korean (compared to 25% in Japan
 
and 8.4% in the United States). Daily per capita caloric
 
intake has risen from 2090 calories in 1962 to 2468 calories
 
in 1969, an increase of 18%. 1 The government has repeatedly
 
tried to alter the food consumption patterns of its citizens
 
by first urging restaurants, and later forcing them, to
 
substitute other grains for rice on certain days of the
 
week. But, not surprisingly, most people have been reluctant
 
to switch from rice to other cereals, and perhaps only the
 
price mechanism can eventually change eating habits.
 
Radios, television sets, and movie theaters have
 
introduced a partial means of escape from the daily drudgery
 
of farm labor throughout the countryside. The number of
 
television antennas that now dot the rural landscape is
 
surprisingly high in areas that are electrified, but by
 
1970 only 1.2% of rural villages were fully electrified
 
and only 11.82 were more than half electrified. 2 It is
 
usually the most isolated areas that have least access
 
to various forms of "electronic" recreation.
 
Agriculture in Korea, 1972, p. 12. In 1971, rural daily
 
per capita caloric intake exceeded urban per capita
 
caloric intake, 2630 to 2534. See KASS, p. 59.
 
2KASS, p. 29.
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PART II:
 
MICRO-LEVEL ANALYSIS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND
 
RURAL DEVELOPMENT IN SOUTH KOREA
 
A. Introduccion to Part II
 
Having outlined the basic components of South
 
Korea's rural administrative network and mapped out 
very
 
briefly the productivity, income, and social welfare
 
aspects of rural development over the past decade, 
this
 
next part of the study will present a miczo-level 
exam­
ination of local government and rural development in 
two
 
specific counties in South Korea.
 
These two areas were visited by the author and
 
The first area
 
a field assistant in the summer of 1973. 

a rather prosperous agricul­("County A") is regarded as 
 ("County B") is much less
 tural district while the second 

Both areas were selected on the basis of our previous
 so. 

familiarity with them and so the choice was not entirely
 
However, some attention was given to the desir­random. 

ability of comparing counties situated in different
 
provinces, with as many contrasting geographical 
features
 
as would be possible in a small nation with relatively
 These criteria

uniform topographical characteristics. 
 Because
 
were largely met in the two counties we visited. 

of the time limitation placed upon our field research, 
we
 
cannot prove the representativeness of the observations
 
claim that the conclusions reached
made nor can we 

a whole. But Korean

necessarily apply for the country as 

administrative practices are generally regarded as
 
remarkably uniform from region to region, and this
 
observation should temper a too-hasty inference that 
a
 
two-case study cannot have implications for the operation
 
of the broader system within which the two cases function.
 
Although we did not attempt to structure our
 
interviews with local officials and farmers too rigidly,
 
the following types of questions guided our research:
 
1. What alternate channels do South Korean farmers
 
have open to them to participate meaningfully in the conduct
 
of local public affairs, given the fact that at present
 
there are no local-level elections above the hamlet level
 
and no local public decision-making bodies selected from
 
below?
 
2. How do local officials go about gauging public
 
opinion on local issues in the absence of significant
 
voluntary associations that in other countries might
 
agqregate and articulate collective interests?
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3. In a system that has often been characterized
 
as being highly-centralized and bureaucratically top­
heavy, how does the central government respond to local
 
needs and evaluate centrally-conceived but locally-admin­
istered projects?
 
4. To what extent and in what manner do local
 
officials comply with policy directives emanating from
 
the central government?
 
5. What types of problems can be treated strictly
 
at the local level, without excessive central interference?
 
6. What has been the impact of the New Community

Movement and other government projects on the overall level
 
of development in South Korea's rural areas, and how do
 
local officials and individual farmers react to these
 
programs?
 
7. How do local administrators conduct the day-to­
day routines of their office, and what is the nature and
 
extent of inter-agency cooperation and coordination at the
 
local level?
 
8. In general, what has been the role of local
 
public institutions in promoting rural development?
 
We pursued these and other related questions by
 
first conducting interviews with county-level officials
 
in the three main organizations described earlier. From
 
the county, we "descended" to the next lower administrative
 
tier, the township, and from there visited the neighborhood
 
association (hamlet) where we talked both with the local
 
leader and individual farmers.
 
B. The Areas Visited
 
County A is situated on Korea's west coast in a
 
relatively isolated area, approximately four hours' travel
 
from Seoul and five hours from the provincial capital by

train and bus. There is no direct rail link to the area,
 
and in June 1973, the road connecting the county seat with
 
the nearest rail facility was unpaved. County B is located
 
southeast of County A in a neighboring province, and is
 
inland. Its county seat is linked to the "outside world"
 
by an excellent recently-constructed asphalt highway, and
 
is only a forty-five minute drive from its provincial
 
capital. Some basic demographic data comparing the two
 
counties are given in Table 17.
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Table 17: Demographic Data for Areas Visited in
 
Field Research
 
(all figures are for 1971)
 
County A County B National 
Area (k2) 997.0 621.0 
Population 260,787.0 107,282.0 
Population engaged in 
agriculture 219,037.0 84,283.0 
% Agr. of total population 84.0% 79.0% 
No. of farm households 35,250.0 15,690.0 
Farm pop./households 6.2 6.0 5.93 
Pop. density (km2 ) 262.0 173.0 320.00 
Area of cultivated land: 
Paddy (%) 
Upland (%) 
52.6% 
47.4% 
55.3% 
44.7% 
55.70% 
44.30% 
Land area/farm household 
(in hectare) 1.02 .78 .92 
Source: Statistical yearbooks of respective counties for 1972.
 
County B, with a considerably lower population
 
density than County A, has an average farm size per
 
household well below the national average, while County
 
A's average farm size is somewhat higher than the national
 
figure. This is partly attributable to the fact that a
 
larger portion of County B's total land area is
 
forested (68.6% compared with 59.8% for County A) and
 
is quite rugged, while County A has considerable flat­
lands and tidal areas.
 
Both counties are primarily engaged in grain
 
production, although both are currently trying to
 
stimulate sericulture and cash crop production through
 
government-sponsored programs. Rice yields, as only one
 
example of agricu]tural productivity, are nearly identical,
 
with County A having 3348 kg./hectare and County B, 3358
 
kg./hcctare in 1971 (the national average was also 3358
 
kg./hectare for that year). Yields of other major crops
 
are also very similar. 1
 
1Yearbook of Agriculture and Forestry Statistics, 1972,
 
p. 138.
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Table 18 shows the distribution of'farm househQlds
 
by size of holding for Counties A and B for 1971:
 
Table 18: Number of Farm Households by Size of Far..
 
Land Under Cultivation, 1971 (in percentage)*
 
-0.5 ha 0.5 to 1.0 ha 1.0 to 1.5 ha 1.5 to 2.0 ha +2.0 ha
 
County A 25.4% 33.2% 21.8% 9.9% 7.7%
 
County B 36.5% 36.1% 17.1% 6.2% 2.9%
 
*Rows do not add up to 100% because of incomplete data.
 
Source: Statistical Yearbooks of respective counties for 1972.
 
Holdings of less than half a hectare are usually considered
 
near or below subsistence-level while farms larger than two
 
hectares in area are relatively large by Korean standards.
 
In both counties surveyed, half or more of all "arm house­
holds were living very close to the subsistence level, with
 
County B clearly the poorer of the two. While there is
 
always some question as to the accuracy of these official
 
statistics because of the tendency to conceal hidden holdings
 
that stand in violation of the three hectare limit fo:
 
maximum farm size, 1 the figures generally conform to the
 
overall national pattern of land holdings. Even by the most
 
optimistic accounts, the small size of farm holdings is a
 
major constraint on household incomes in these two counties.
 
C. County Government
 
Structure: The county functions as the "local
 
autonomous body." As such it is the pivotal coordinating
 
structure between the central ministries and the lowest
 
levels of government. It is mainly involved in transmitting
 
instructions from higher (provincial end central) to lower
 
(township) administrative tiers, in overseeing local projects,
 
and in reporting results from lower to higher levels. The
 
organizational structures of both counties surveyed were
 
identical, as shown in Figure 4:
 
1This limit is now under revision.
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Figure 4: County Organizational Structure
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County Executive.
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(7 bureaus) (3 bureaus) (3 bureaus)
I
 
Townships
I
 
Neighborhood Associations
 
Source: Statistical yearbooks of respective counties for 1972.
 
While the county executive exercises de jure supervision
 
and control over Rural Guidance Office and Health Ce ter
 
activities, these agencies are linked vertically to
 
separate national organizations as well.
 
Personnel: All employees of the county government
 
office, from the county executive down to the lowest-ranking
 
clerk, are appointed either directly by the county executive
 
or by higher bureaucratic levels, depending on the grade of
 
the position. Appointments are based in part on competitive
 
examinations, but persondl influence with key county, pro­
vincial, or even national officials can also De a determining 
factor. The volatility of the higher-ranking positions such 
as county executive and section chief in the county govern­
ment is demonstrated by the turnover rate for these positions:
 
the average tenure for the executive in County A over a
 
fifteen-year period was 19.4 months; that for the County B
 
executive, 17.4 months for a sixteen-year period.1 Even
 
1From 1972 statistical yearbooks of the two counties.
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shorter periods were recorded for section chiefs in the
two counties. Such-short tenure in one location does
not reflect removal for malfeasance or incompetence so
much as a long-standing Korean administrative practice
of constantly shifting key officials around (almost
always within the 
same general district) to prevent
their accumulating substantial political or economic
capital in any one area. 
 The result of this transfer
process seems 
to have been a kind of "mediocratization"

of elite leadership at the county level: 
 officials set
their sights on 
'moving up' to larger countius or even to
provincial positions as quickly as possible, and thus
focus their attention on highly-visible, low-risk projects.
Rarely do they adopt the position of county lobbyist as
local officials in the United States are often prone to
do; rather, they serve as protagonists of national and
provincial policies so 
as not 
to incur the disfavor of
those above them who are in 
a position to affect their
careers. 
 Skillful administrators move on to higher levels,
leaving the less competent ones 'behind.'
 
One structural feature of organizational life in
Korea that facilitates frequent transfer, whether the
organization be the post office department, the school
system, a private bank, or a public office, is the homo­geneity of organizational arrangements at any given level
throughout the system. 
Thus, 
a county executive has no
need to concern himself with readjusting to a completely
unfamiliar accounting system or planning mechanism as 
he
moves from location to location: 
 papers are shuffled in
very similar ways throughout the countryside.
 
The county officials that I met were usually
natives of t1-e 
same province, and frequently of the same
district to which they were presently assigned. 
 Bureau
and section chiefs tended to be in their forties and
early fifties, qchile clerks and messengers were of course
much younger. 
The two chief executives were both in their

early fifties.
 
Despite the fact that County A had more than twice
the population of County B, the total number of persons1
employed in the two county offices was almost the 
same.
Different mixes of national/local civil servants could be
observed, however. 
Many newly-appointed officials are now
being sent to provincial training centers to enhance
 
iIbid.
 
-44­
their administrative skills. The major universities,
 
especially the Seoul National University School of
 
Public Administration, have produced large numbers
 
of graduates trained in the basic principles of public

administration, but few of these seem to have filtered
 
down to the county level or below. Most officials that
 
I met had not advanced beyond high school or technical
 
school, and none had graduated from a specialized college
 
of public administration.
 
Planning and Finance: Counties are responsible
 
for drafting annual budgets and submitting them to the
 
provincial governor fcr approval, but the process is not
 
one in which any degre3 of initiative is taken by the
 
counties. County officials must not only incorporate
 
"handed down" project plans from higher levels into their
 
own budgets, but must also carefully consider the financial
 
constraints imposed by scarce local tax resources and by a
 
very high degree of dependence on central subsidies and
 
grants-in-aid that are usually earmarked for specific
 
purposes. In the narrow range of policy-making where
 
county officials possess a limited degree of autonomy
 
in designating "special projects," the mechanisms for
 
reaching a decision may vary slightly from coui.ty to
 
county depending on the particular style of the county
 
executive; however, the process described by the two
 
county executives I interviewed was probably relatively
 
typical of a more general decision-making style.
 
Key elements in the planning proess are frequent
 
meetings between high-ranking county officials and other
 
county lcaders, a constant barrage of communications from
 
the provincial capital, and numerous trips to the provincial
 
government seat to receive briefings and directives. In
 
County A, the county executive organized a monthly conference
 
of county leaders (composed of the top educational officials,
 
court officials, the police, section chiefs of the county
 
government, agricultural cooperative officials, and retired
 
military officers). There suggestions for future projects
 
were solicited and reports on past progress reviewed. In
 
this same county, the county executive relied to some extent
 
on reports and petitions from township officials and on
 
personal inspection tours of projects in progress to deter­
mine what the future needs of an area might be. In County

B, the executive held a meeting of the highest county
 
government officials almost daily to receive reports and
 
issue instructions. On the basis of these intensive contacts
 
as well as directives received from the provincial governor's
 
office, plans were formulated and discussed.
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The method of arriving at decisions once proposals
have been put on the table is quite familiar to students
 
of decision-makinq styles in Japaiiese and Korean organi­
zations: 
 an item is first talked to death, with almost
 
everyone participating in the discussion, until the leader
has a sense that there is general agreement on what the
decisional outcome should be. Usually 
-n attempt is madefrom the beginning to narrow the range of alternatives to
only one, and that one is usually the choice most desired
by the influential members of the group. 
 Sjnce there is

almost always a 'consensus' on the desired outcome, formal
 
voting rarely occurs and there is 
no dissent from the
 
decision.
 
Both county executives we inzerviewed indicated
 
that 90% 
or more of the plans for future projects and

activities were "handed-down," and less than ten percent

consisted of locally-initiated "special projects." 
 In
 
County B, we werc informed that at least one of three

special local projects under consideration, the development*

of a lake area, had been recognized as a problem requiring
governmental action more than twenty years ago, but that
 
continual shortages of funds had made execution of the
 
plan an impossibility thus far. Officials added that the

regular budget did not even provide sufficient funds to
 
execute satisfactorily the 90% of the projects that had
 
been "handed-down."
 
Examination of settled accounts for the tdo
 
counties for 1972 reveals an extreme degree of dependence
 
on non-local revenues for financial support (Table 19):
 
Table 19: Summary of Settled Accounts, 1972 (in percent)
 
All Counties County A County B 
Revenues 
Local Tax Resources 
Non-tax Revenues 
Revenue-sharing 
Subsidy 
11.5% 
7.8 
47.7 
33.0 
15.8% 
7.9 
42.3 
34.0 
6.9% 
8.6 
54.3 
30.2 
Expenditures 
Administrative 
Public Utilities 
Industry/Economic 
Social Welfare 
Other 
38.1% 
24.8 
27.7 
7..7 
1.7 
41.9% 
17.9 
32.3 
7.7 
0.2 
40.5% 
25.1 
25.5 
8.8 
0.1 
Source: Budgets of respective counties for 1972.
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On the expenditure side, both counties adhered
 
rather closely to the national average for all counties
 
with about two-fifths of the money spent going directly
 
Projects
to administrative expenses, usually salaries. 

for industrial and agricultural improvement/promotion
 
received one-fourth to one-third of the allocated funds.
 
Social welfare expenditures were relatively inconsequential.
 
There has been a slight change in emphasis over
 
the past few years from expenditures for capital projects
 
geared largely to improving the local infrastructure to
 
capital investments designed to enhance local production
 
through the introduction of new special crops or small
 
manufacturing enterprises.
 
Developmental activities: Almost all ongoing
 
activities that relate to rural development at the local
 
levl are channeled through and administered by the
 
county government. At times the county officials may
 
assume the role of supervisor or "watch dog" over other
 
local agencies (i.e., if the county cooperative is
 
engaged in a crop diversification scheme or the Rural
 
Guidance Office launches a pest control program). At
 
other times the direct expenditure of county funds and
 
constant direction by county officials may be involved.
 
County B, for example, offered the following
 
classification of its major activities for 1973:1
 
1. Strengthening the October Spirit of Revitalization
 
proclaimed by President Park.
 
2. The New Community Move.rment. 
3. Income Enhancement Projects.
 
4. Regional Development Projects.
 
5. Military Administration.
 
The projects for the New Community Movement included
 
very specific and detailed plans for instructing the farmers
 
in how to attain a more "scientific spirit" concerning
 
cultivation; for establishing 'private' money clubs in the
 
villages that would in effect replace the centuries-old
 
collective aid societies; for roof, road, river, stream,
 
ditch, and dike improvements; and for facilities to
 
improve rural sanitation. Among the "income enhancement
 
projects" were plans to introduce sericulture to more
 
households; breeding of "Kor(.an" cows; planting chestnut
 
1From 1973 budget draft of County B.
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trees, ginsaenq, medicinal herbs and roots', and other
 
cash crops; stimulating the formation of labor pools

for rice planting and harvesting; increasing barley
production; and establishing a large-scale forest.
Regional development projects included the financing

of certain social welfare projects, lake development,

electrification, improving water supplies, constructing

and repairing national highways, and setting up 
a
 
disaster-relief program.
 
In addition to these planned projects, the
 
counties receive petitions for special local projects

requiring small 
sums of money (usually transmitted
 
throughout the township office and involving minor
infrastructural improvements). 
 In 1972, for exitmple,
County A received 108 petitions from township officials,

and of these, 48 were eventually approved. Few or no
 
petitions are received directly from individual citLzens,

although an occasional exception might involve one of
 
the larger farmers in the area. In County B, 
 the county
executive reported that he received two or three requests
annually from each township he visited on an inspection
tour, and of these requests, Perhaps ten to twcnty percent 
were approved. Projects involving expenditures of less
 
than W500,000 (U.S. $1,250 at June 1973 exchange rate)

were handed over entirely to the respective townships

for execution, while more expensive projects required
 
county supervision.
 
Of course, not all plans are executed fully,

due to limited financial resources, and some of the

"special projects" are no more than "paper plans" drawn 
up largely to impress visiting provincial and national

officials. Some projects are adequately funded, however,

and receive considerable attention from higher-level

officials who must answer 
to cabinet ministers and perhaps

to the President himself. In the summer of 1973, 
one

such project was the New Community Movement. Oneinteresting indication of the high priority this project

was receiving was the fact that County B had two official 
vehicles at its disposal: one jeep for the county

executive and another for the New Coumiunity Movement 
section in the county government.
 
A typical example of the extent to which the
 
county is more a transmitter of higher-level programs

than its 
own autonomous agent is the description related
 
to us by an official in the Agricultural and Forestry

Section of County B, of the process involved in carrying

out the county's project to introduce the cultivation of
 
silkworms, ginsaeng, tobacco, and medicinal herbs to the
 
area;
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First, the section received from the provincial
 
government "guidance for the selection criteria to be
 
used in choosing project farmers," as well as "guidance
 
on new technology related to special crops." Then the
 
section ordered townships to draft plans for the intro­
duction of special crops and to select farmers to be
 
involved in the project, presumably based upon criteria
 
drawn up at the provincial (national?) level, After
 
township programs had been instituted, the section was
 
responsible for receiving detailed monthly reports on
 
these programs and for personally inspecting project
 
sites to evaluate progress to date. The results of all
 
this reporting and inspecting would then be forwarded
 
to the province for further study.
 
In another project to control crop pests and
 
diseases, the same section worked closely with the county
 
Rural Guidance Office and the county agricultural cooper­
ative to coordinate the sale of chemicals and the testing
 
of suspect plants, and was responsible for submitting

"endle.3s" reports to the province on accomplishments and
 
deficiencies in the program.
 
The county project summaries issued at year's
 
end are interesting documents in the extent to which
 
they reveal county officials' inclinations to establish
 
project goals that are certain to be fulfilled or, in
 
the case of projects that are especially high-priority
 
items, overfulfilled. As only one example, in 1972
 
County B reported that it had fulfilled 100% or more of
 
its plan projections for 23 of 29 separate projects, and
 
that, interestingly enough, in two areas that had received 
special emphasis from the provincial and national levels, 
the project results had exceeded the original goal by 
considerable margins. While there are no doubt a number 
of ways to interpret these results, they certainly seem 
to confirm the notion that in a highly centralized 
administrative system where promotion to a higher level 
position can receive greater consideration than satisfying 
local 'constituency' demands, officials can tailor plans 
and projections to make certain that quotas are fulfilled 
and priority items overfulfilled. The precise congruence 
of expectations with achievements for 17 out of County B's 
29 projects (i.e., fulfilling the plan by exactly 100%) 
raises as many doubts about the adequacy of such goals 
for developmenta1 purposes as feelings of satisfaction at 
having reached projected goals.
 
Horizontal and Vertical Linkages: Time and again
 
in intervews with county officials, the following general
 
pattern of coordinating linkages was enunciated (Figure 5):
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Figure 5: Coordinating Linkages of County Governments
 
Provincial Governor 
(and functional sections)
,i A-
Other Counties 
- 'Cou't 
-
ouny Executive<--- )Rural Guidance 
Aand functional section Office 
// i gr. Coop.
I Township Chiefs 
II II 
Nei hborhood Association Chiefs
 
Individual Farmers
 
-preparing
reports, requests, petitions
 
supervision, inspection, encouragement
 
communication, coordination
 
Organizational life in South Korea is 
an inteuse experience

and county goveriunent is no exception to this general

characterization. Meetings and conferences, written
 
communications, telephone calls, inspection and observation
 
trips, and personal visits are extru.- 1v frequenL, and
 
virtually no official is left unscathed , this dizzying
 
process. Many officials complained, in fact, - ' excessive
 
reporting requirements greatly interfered with the cvnduct
 
of their offices. Rather sterile presentations and "seminars"
 
are almost a daily occurrance in Korean administrative life
 
for those in a decision-making capacity.
 
Personal connections (called baek, a Koreanized
 
version of "background") are vital to the success of most
 
governmental affairs, whether the goal be the acquisition

of a piece of office equipment, arranging for a transfer
 
to the provincial capital, or securing funds for a long­
sought developmental project in one's region. To establish
 
and maintain these connections, generous gifts and deference
 
are the order of the day, and there seems to be a high

correlation between generosity and the achievement of
 
one's goals. Viewed in this perspective, it is no wonder
 
that Korean officials have as much intense interaction as
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they do: not having the correct baek can spell failure
 
for the most well-conceived project. It is important,
 
therefore, to understand that personal interaction is
 
by no means indicative of any real effort to coordinate
 
activities among agencies or to harmonize conflicting
 
goals and values. On the contrary, such pursuits often
 
receive lower priority than the more highly-valued goal
 
of securing instrumental compliance with personal
 
(.'private') demands. 'Public' and 'private' goods often
 
lose their distinction in the 1orean marketplace.
 
Thus, it was not uncommon to hear that despite
 
monthly or even weekly conferences between county govern­
ment and cooperative officials, for example, parties on
 
both sides felt that their respective activities were
 
uncoordinated or even at cross-purposes. In a somewhat
 
different vein, township chiefs would be assembled at
 
the county office for the purpose of receiving new
 
project plans, and little or no public interest-oriented
 
interaction between county and town leaders would take 
reassureplace. The town chiefs would merely the county 
executive of their support and compliance, while the 
critical variible in the process, the degree to which 
actual compliance would reflect personal.- considerations 
or personal favors owed, would remain unspoken.
 
Supervision and Control: The observation or
 
inspection visit of a higher level official, whether from
 
the provincial government, the Minist.y of Home Affairs, 
one of the other functional ministries, or from 'he
 
President's personal staff, sets in motion a wave of
 
overtime activities designed to assure the visitor of
 
strict compliance with the guidelines set down and cheerful 
cooperation throughout the lower levels. Briefing charts 
are prepared, lavish entertainment arranged, and clerks 
and custodians frantically set to work scrubbing down the
 
offices and clearing away unsightly debris. Again, as in
 
the case of the frequent "coordinating committee" meetings 
discussed above, one wonders to what extent either party 
involved in this elaborate visi tation. ritual really 
accepts what is taking place at face value. The seriousness 
and.objectivity of the report that will eventually be filed 
on the visit may well be a function of the visiting 
official's age and background: younger officials from 
the central ministries, often possessing American university 
degrees in public administration or development economics, 
could not be expected to adhere to the same set of values 
and behavioral norms as oder bureaucrats trained in the old
 
Japanese imperial system and accustomed to unquestioning
 
deference and obedience.
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The manner in which my assistant and I were
 
greeted by the two different county offices we visited
 
is revealing in this respect: We-arrived in County A
 
unannounced and presented ourselves directly to the
 
assistant to the county executive. Everyone was
 
courteous, of course, and eventually helpful, but some
 
time elapsed between our initial introductions and the
 
point at which we were taken more seriously. In County

B, on the other hand, everyone knew of our arrival
 
beforehand through the office of the provincial vice­
governor. We reached the county building one hour later 
than originally planned, and found, -o our dLsmay, that 
the county executivc had assembled in his offtce all of 
his section chiefs, the county cooperative manager, and 
the chief of the county Rural Guidance Office more than
 
three hours before. Transportation was provided for us
 (we took the bus in County A) and each official in turn
 
entertained us at a restauzant or tearoom. As it became
 
clearer to these officials, however, that we had not been 
sent on an evaluative mission by the Korean or American
 
governments, and that we were mainly interested in the 
daily operations of their office, interest in us declined
 
markedly and favors diminished. Ultimately, the receptions
afforded us in the two counties yielded rather similar 
results in terms of information collected and contacts
 
established. But the initial impact of our arrival differed 
substantially according to who we were perceived to be.
 
Of course, besides the unexpected drop-in visits
 
of higher-level officials, county governments are also
 
subject to regular periodic audits by the provincial
 
government. And, in a similar manner, county officials
 
in the various functional sections are frequently out
 
in the field talking to township and neighborhood associ­
ation leaders and reporting on their activities to the
 
county executive.
 
D. The County Agricultural Cooperative
 
Structure: The agricultural cooperatives in
 
Counties A and B were organized along very similar lines,
 
as shown in Figure 6. In County A, there was also a
 
Coop Advisory Committee composed of the County Coop

Chief, the County Executive, the County Rural Guidance
 
Office executive, and the leaders of the various specialized

cooperatives. This committee dealt with general organizational
 
management and certain educational campaigns.
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Figure 6: Organizational Structure of County
 
Agricultural Cooperatives
 
General Committee
 
Board of Directors
 
County C op Chief
 
County Coop Manager
 
Dept. of Dept. of Economic Dept. of Rural Dept. of 
Credit Projects Guidance Planning 
loans purchasing/selling town coop 
savings transportation supervision 
storage some extension 
work 
special projects 
(i.e., sericulture) 
The coop's General Committee was a legal device
 
(whose membership consisted of all coop,members in the 
county) responsible for selecting the County Coop Chief; 
in fact, this person was selected by the Central Committee 
of the NACF in Seoul. The County Coop Chief in turn 
appointed the County Coop Manager, who was the day-to-day 
administrative executive cf the organization, and this 
appointment was subject to approval by the Board of Directors. 
Heads and lesser clerks of the various departments were 
appointed throucih competitive examinations administered 
by the central NACF. 
Operating Activities: The functions and daily 
operating procedures of county coops are strictly regulated
 
by the central NACF. Since the coop possesses a monopoly 
on fertilizer seles and to a large extent controls marketing, 
purchasing, and storage facilities for agricultural products
 
as well as a cheap and fairly accessible credit source for 
the purchase of necessary agricultural inputs, it should
 
not be surprising that in County A 86% of the farmers 
(defined as "one who owns a farm or participates in farm 
labor 60 or more days- annually or owns five or more 
beehives") belonged to the coop. In County B, 87%, of the 
farm population belonged. While membership requirements 
are identical (i.e., the purchase of at least one share of
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coop stock valued at 41000--u.S. $2.50 at June 1973
 
exchange rate), 
County A insisted on purchase in two
yearly payments of )4500 each, while County B was more
lenient and allowed four annual installments of 14250
 
each.
 
The financial services offered by the coops

are extensive and generally available to most farmerc.
However, farmers' traditional reliance on private mutuai

aid societies still seems 
to account for a substantial
 
portion of the financial transactions that farmers must

conduct, although precise data on this aspect of rural
credit and savings are not available. Nonetheless, in
County A per-household savings in the coiint:y coop

averaged 119,858 (approximately U.S. $50)l and per­household loans for fertilizer, 144,255 (U.S. $11). 
 The
former figure represented 6% of the average yea:ly income
 
for all farm households in South Korea in 1971, and the
 
latter, 1%.
 
There are several types of coop loans, some

available only to 
farmers and some for more general­
purpose projects. General agriculture loans to member
farmers are available on both short and long 
term
 
repayment plans (the former for one year at 12% 
interest,
the latter for two to ten years at 
8-9%), and the amount
that can be borrowed depends on the size of the individual
farm (i.e., small fa;mers--below one hectare--up to 1450,000
(U.S. $125); middle farmers--one to two hectares--up to
14100,000 (U.S. $250); 
and big farmers--above two hectares-­
up to 1300,0,00 (U.S. $750).) Loans can be used for the

purchase of farm equipment (usually from the coop),
fertilizer purchase (only from the coop), 
for
 
for farm labor
 
wages, or for special projects (sericulture, etc.) Under
 
a "special crops" program, funds for this last purpose

were more readily available and at slightly better terms
in the summer of 1973, aided by a healthy injection of

central Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry money.
Another category of special loan was also available on
 
a short-term basis, 
one year at 15.5% for amounts up to
 
14500,000.
 
The interest rates cited above may seem inordinately
high for a rural credit program designed to make funds

accessible to even the smallest cultivators, but in the
Korean context, they are very reasonable if not rather low.
Private money clubs 
are known to carry interest rates of
 
1At the June 1973 exchange rate. 
All of the following

dollar figures are also given at the June 1973 rate of
 
exchange.
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50% yearly or even higher, and yet the .attraction of
 
this traditional institution, reinforced by a general
 
distrust of governmental programs and a distaste for
 
the complicated paperwork involved in taking a coop
 
loan as contrasted with borrowing money from a cousin or
 
neighbor, partially accounts for the inability of the
 
government to do away completely with the usurious
 
traditional rural credit structure. 1 In an attempt to
 
co-opt the traditional system into the national economy,
 
the government, through the New Community Movement, has
 
started a campaign to form New Community Money Clubs in
 
rural villages whereby the county coop would absorb part
 
of the mobilized savings. This system offered 12% interest
 
on savings and 30% on small, short-term loans (one indication
 
of how high 'normal' interest rates are). Yet it hardly
 
appeared competitive with a system that could promise a
 
50% return on relatively small sums within a year or less.
 
Acc rding to some coop officials, government
 
efforts to assure at least a minimal amount of credit
 
to even the sialiest farmers have contributed to alleviating, 
in an unintended manner perhaps, the perennial shortage of 
food in the springtime when winter reserves run out. 
Several officials admitted that although small loans were 
ostensibly given for the purchase of fertilizer and other 
inputs, they were often used to buy rice and other food­
stuffs by many subsistence farmers. While this may help 
prever.; immediate starvation, it often contributes in the 
longer run to compelling these marginal dultivators to 
rely on the more expensive private credit system for the 
purchase of agricultural inputs when planting season 
arrives. 
Provisions for penalizing defaulting on coop loans
 
were technically strict, but the system seemed to allow for
 
liberal interpretation of the law in certain instances.
 
Failure to repay a loan on time when there was no legitimate
 
excuse for non-payment would mean rejection of the next loan 
application, while iailure due to some natural disaster 
would be tolerated provided the farmer eventually repaid 
it (with no additional interest burden) . The manager of 
the County A coop told us, however, that in particularly 
severe hardship cases, repayment periods were extended
 
even without 'legitimate' excuses, and occasionally debt
 
burdens were quietly dropped.
 
According to KASS, p. 28, "a 1968 NACF farm credit survey
 
shows that the average farmer borrowed...26.5 percent
 
from credit institutions (almost exclusively NACF) and
 
73.5 percent from private sources."
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E. The County Rural Guidance Office
 
Rural Guidance Offices (RGG) have the least
 
secure institutional roots in the South Korean country­
side. Perhaps for this reason, several RGO officials 
in the counties we visi ted spoke with concern regarding 
a felt disparity beween higher-level tendencies to 
disregard RGO financial and organizational pl-ob~ems
while demanding ,-j wide range of e:en, hitedion-re 
services for farmers. '[he list of RGO activilties is 
indeed impressive: in County A, the RGO wrv involved
 
in providing a great deal of tec-hnical information to
 
farmers; in trying to per.uade farmers to improve

production throucgh seed improvement, through the use of
 
chemicals to control pests and diseases, and through the
 
introduction of ctsh crops and newer agricull-ural techniques;
in giving direction to the 4-1l Movement and to [,ife Improve­
ment Groups for men and women; and in contribut-ing money

and materials to the development of model farms . But
 
this involvement seemed weverely restricted by both a
 
shortage of funds and a lack of qualified personnel.l 
Both RGO county offices we visiLed were relatively 
quiet and scantily equipped; part of Lhe rea:3on fIor the 
tranquility was that:, it being rice transplant-inq season, 
most RGO workers were out in the fields instruct inj and 
advising farmers. But although RGO people wored closely
with farmers, a sense of detachmienf-, even iso],ation, from 
the county government office, to whiLch the RGO was admin­
istratively responsible, was evident; in fact, this condition 
was freely admitted by the RGO executive in County A. lie 
told us that on occasion he neglected to attend the monthly
County Leaders' Meeting, because he felt there was little 
sympaLhy for his role and little respect for his position.

In the previous year, the county had approved only 43% oif
 
his original budget request. Unlike most other 
 ranking
officials at the county level, this nan was not a native 
of the province--he had been recruited and appointed by
the central Office for Rural Development, as had many of 
his staff--and this meant that he did not pos.s;ess the
"political capital" that the older, more experienced
"native" count, officials had accumulated through years 
of interpersonal dealings. In a context where personal

contacts and influence are so vital, the RGO lacked the
 
prerequisites of achievement and success within the admin­
istrative system. This 
is not to say that the RGO did not
 
1Nationally, in 1971, there were 
6051 RGO personnel, or
 
approximately one RGO worker for each 410 farm households.
 
About half of RGO personnel had B.S. degrees. See KASS,
 
p. 27. In the areas we visited,'none of the workers--d
 
college training.
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achieve substantial gains in its rural extension efforts;
 
as we shall see shortly, the activities of the RGO are
 
familiar to and generally respected by farmers. But
 
administrative success is by no means a function of
 
serving the people well in South Korea.
 
F. The Township Level
 
Formerly the center of administrative and political
 
life in South Korea, the township bas been transformed
 
into a placid and relatively inert branch of the county
 
government since 1961. There are town branches of both
 
the agricultural coops and the Rural Guidance Offices, and
 
incessant rounds of meetings, conferences, communications
 
with higher levels, reception of visits from county and
 
occasio:.ally provincial officials. Written reports and
 
statistical (.ompilations preoccupy the township clerks 
and officials much as these activities take up the time 
of higher-level personnel. 
Township executives and personnel are more likely 
to be local residents Llan county officials, and consequently 
local 'political' appointmentts as well as pressures based on 
longer-standin mutual obligations can be correspondingly 
more intense.
 
The township office has four functional sections, 
generally parallel to those of the county: Town Industry 
Section, Finance Section, General Affairs Section, and 
Family Registers Section (including military conscription 
registrition) The maintenance of family registers is a 
long-standi nq activi Ly of Korean townships. Recently, a 
New Coimmunlty Movement section has been grafted on to the 
pro-exis-1ing organizati.onal structure. 
The major thriut of policy initiative is, of course, 
downward from the coiInty, an( LO.n officials must carefully 
consider quimdel]ines sel: forth by the county when drawing up 
th2 t own nClhj(t-. In the town we vi sited in County 13, the 
township ('hi ef er!tj m,,tLed the raLio of handed-down to locally­
initiat(ed oj-(,je cts to be at I ,,,s 9:1. Tn the town in 
County A, lihe chief reported that of tw(,ive special projects 
submitte;d Lo the coutity in t-ie last yer , eight were approved. 
Still, thes( account(l( for only a snall portion of the 
mandated t(, n:n111ti o( Lvil, Lts. Town A had the following 
budget bre,,ml:down, for 1972: 
1. Salary (,admII inistrative) 70.0% 
2. Project expenses 2.4% 
3. Custodial 2.7% 
4. Miscellaneous 25.0% 
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Handed-down projects for this township included repairing
and improving roads, ditches, dikes, and small bridges;
building public playgrounds and pulic toilet facilities;installing sewage and water conduits and pub]ic wells;
and other projects falling under the rubric of the New 
Community Movement. Special township projects i.ncluded 
an electri ficaLion proqram, some larg(Ir bridge const ruc Lion,
and numerous sm1all pub[ILC works projects. One may questz on
how the township manaced to finance M1.1 of these projects
with such a sm,ill percentage of iLs budget (itself relatively
meager) allocaLed to projecL expenses. The, inswer I i es 
partly in the proces, described earlier of havtn more plans 
on paper than are actually carried out and party in the
rei;,once on local informal or extra legal contC'ibutions of 
money and1 labor by individual farmers. This conLribut on 
system, another feaure of tradi,[tional Korean rural social 
organizat: ion, is administered th1^ou,-gh the ne Lglborhood
associations or through even lower-l(2el units. 
For the most part, -mall--scale projects are hamlet,
and not Lownship, affairs. B1t since the Lownihip is thelowest- level offLcial adminisCraCi.ve iLructurei.n the local 
government system, officLal reporting and pet ihLions frcm 
lower levels musC be channeled through it. Thus, township
officials are rather extensiveAy involve I in viLti nq or 
otherwise coimunicating wi th neighborhood assocLation 
chiefs on an almost daily ba.,is, coll.ecting 1.Ltr of 
information and transmitting new project tasks from the 
county.
 
When individual farmers have complaints (or more
rarely, suggestions), they occasionally visit the township
office to communicate their feelings. In Town B, for 
example, it was reported that an average of 3 or 4 farmers
visited the township office daily for this purpose. Rarely
do farmers go higher than the township level to bring an 
issue to the attention of public officials. The normal 
way of treating these affairs is to take up the individual 
complaint or request at a meeting of town section chicfs,
with the final decision on disposition of the case coming
from the township chief. In Town A, approximately 15 of 50 
or so requests were approved through this process in the 
course of a year. Obviously, these 50 represented issues 
on which considerable consensus had been formed prior to
their disposition at the township meting; it would be 
rare for an individual farmer, much less a collective body

such as a neighborhood association, to submit petitions on
 
matters that were either highly controversial or trivial
 
in farmers' minds. In this sense, a 30% approval rate
 (for only very small projects) is not especially high.
 
The township agricultural cooperative, regarded
 
as the "primary" cooperative unit, has an organizational
 
structure similar to that of its parent structure, the
 
county coop, and divides some functions with the county
 
level as follows:
 
County coop Functions Township Coop Functions
 
long-term loans short-term loans
 
sale of large machinery sale of small machinery
 
savings accounts for savings accounts for
 
non-members members
 
loans for non-members sale of fertilizer
 
In addition, both townships we visited had coop "chain
 
stores" that sold daily household necessities on a non­
profit basis.
 
Town B had no township branch of a Rural Guidance 
Office, and so farmers often relied on the town government 
to transmit requests for various tests and technical infor­
mation to the county RGO. Town A, however, did have a 
branch RGO with a staff of eight young people, all recent 
g-aduates of agricultural hicgh schools. These were the 
people who, through pamphleteerJng, speaker cars, slide/
movie vans, direct visits to faimers' homes and fields, 
and visits by farmers to -he. town PGO office, had the 
most direct access to individual farm hou,;eholds for 
extension services. Most RGO rcrsonne] we met seemed 
dedicatect and industrious, but the odds against their 
actually conv±incing farmers to change 'outmoded' ways were 
formidablo: most farmers with whom they had contact were 
at least one generation older than they, and this age (and
experience) differential is almost insurmountable in the 
Korean context. In one particularly memorable scene at a 
farmer's house, we watched a young female RG() worker trying 
to convince an aged grandmother to 'clean up' her kitchen; 
the grandmother nodded her head in apparent agreement with 
the young jirl' s suggestions, and Lhen went about her 
former business after the girl departed. Nonetheless, the 
RGO is the main source of testing equipment and information 
on crop diseases and agro-chemicals in the countryside, and 
one official told us that ten or more farmers personally
visited the town RGO office daily. 
G. Neighborhood Associations (Hamlet) 
Some stlidents of Korean bureaucracy have likened 
it to a pyramid, with the President standing alone at the 
apex and layer upon layer of intermediate strcutures between 
-59­
him and the broad spectrum of masses at the bottom.However, in our visits to several rural hamlets I wereceived a somewhat different image theof overall 
structure when viewed systemically.
 
The hamlet chief is usually selected througha consensual process involvinq hamlct residents al.thoughhis formal appointment comL-s thirough the county executive.lie is the critical focal point of communication betweenindividua] farmers nd the (lovrnment. One hamlet chief,41 years old, listed his po',i tLon. 's folLow' : Iam ( tChief, N(2%.. CommuniLty MovemenIil aeador, Chairman o) theHamlet Deve lopwmenL CommL ttee, Branch ], a h r cf- the
Agricultural Coop 
 ra I:IVe, Policy DepIh1ty, anI Feim Tmprove­mont Cor,'iLtLLe,31 Cite irm,ien. aWh i I e ha it1 may p0 'e s asmall community buiA, ILng (atny are boinq contriucted
under the New CommnitLy Movement), 1:ihe NejhhcohioodAssociation does not have fuInCtio-aLy-I ]VLLVi ',(OctiOnsor bureatius and emp loys no I ul-l im, a L 1eoran s . AllfuncLion- and repotn:;iblitLes coilp:,ino one (:,.][(,goryand fall. upon the heed of lie Nqarjhlhot1ood Asqor* i,il-ionchief. Thus, if we choose t-) v w the h eraIccLol.]structure ot gJovrmnnt as descending L1hrough a diminishingnumber of functional y-class] ifel sectons, from numerousministries at the top LO a single multi-cole posLtion atthe bottom, the sLructure can be most usefully described 
as an "invert Cealpy',lmid." 
Hamlet A (in County A) had 118 families (750residents), while Hamlet B 95. areashad Both wereinvolved mainly in the prodncLion of rice, barley, andonly recently, silkworms. Hamlet B had a meeting hallthat was al.so used as a small textile mill; Hamlet A hadrecently completed a New Community Movement builliing whichserved several functLions: cooperative marketirmg services,rural guidance education, regular conmununity meetings, Lndeven marriage ceremonies. Both buildings were constructedpartly with donations of money and labor by hamlet residents. 
Several governing bodies form the NeighborhoodAssociation in the hamlets. First, there is a regularonce-a-year general meeting of all hamlet residents inDecember to pass on local projects and select leadership
for the following year. 
Second, there is a Village Development
 
We have previously given hamlets the quasi-legal title of
"neighborhood association." 

"Hamlet" connotes essentially
a geographic and social entity, while "neighborhood associa­tion" refers to the same unit when viewed as an administrative
 
structure.
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Committee composed of hamlet notables who meet monthly
 
to draw up specific proposals and prepare agenda items
 
for the general meeting, as well as to advise the
 
Neighborhood Association chief. Decisions on matters
 
taken up in this committee, such as mandatory contribu­
tions for a small public works project, are legally
 
Winding in the sense that fines and other punishments
 
can be levied against defaulters; b"t usually community
 
pressure is enough to ensure compliance. Finally, there
 
is a New Community Meeting composed of all hamlet residents,
 
and at the time we visited, this meeting was very active
 
in receiving newly-assigned tasks from higher levels and
 
deciding on local projects. In Hamlet B, New Community
 
Meetings were being held almost every night during the
 
warmer months because of a constant stream of directives
 
and 'suggestions' issuing from Seoul through the county
 
and town.ship office!. 
In addition to these quasi-legal hamlet organizations, 
there are numerous types of collective aid societies, perhaps 
twenty in liamlet B alone. These are the only private 
organi zations in the hamlet that could be said to contribute 
in some way to rural development; all other 'voluntary' 
groups or clubs are qovernment-sponsored and usually 
governme ntL-sup)erviFscd. 
Township off i.cials visit the hamlets "many times 
every day" and, in addition, visits by county and even 
provincial officials at certain intervals are not uncommon. 
One ourtward ;ymho] of compli, nce with various developmental 
projects a]] ing under the rubric of the New Community 
Movement is a brig]itly-painL-ed map of each hamlet standing 
at its boundary d( ictinI all the projects underway in 
accordance2 -Lth the "national spirit of revitalization." 
Each ham) L's m.p cxtolls i Ls "self-help projects" .in 
almost. caricatured form, and these tableaux are surely 
des.ined as much Io illpres3 a high -lev I visi tor as to 
depict real developmienta] accomplishments, 
Besides the mandated and recommended tasks that 
hamlet. resiidents are expected to perform (not to mention 
their daily farminq efforts), hamlets are involved in 
special projectn that depend almost ent irely on local. 
donations and are often pursued over lonq periods of 
time. Th(e chi.f of the NecJihborhood Associationi in 
Hamlet A was poud to inform us that hiis res idents had 
already contributed V3,000,000 (U.S. $7,500) toward an 
electrifica Lion pro cqt; if they could ra .o another 
equivalent amount, then they could secure governmental 
aid to brinq electricity to the hamlet. 11am] et B, 
located clo.e to the admini strative center of its 
township, was considerably better developed infrastruc­
turally, but it was also involved in special projects, 
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albeit of a more modest scale Lhan Hamlet A: first, it 
was trying to set up a coordinated farm labor pooling 
system (under the tutelage of the Rural Guidance Office);
second, it was involved in attracting small-scale 
industrial enterprises (such as local spinning and 
weaving mills) to the area; and third, it was planting

fruit txees on conununa].ly-owned land. 
11. Farmers' Response to Government Initiative 
A number of Lndividual fzrmers were interviewed 
in the various p1aces we viitc 1, and their re!actions 
to our questions are worth quoting at some length for 
the light they sied on h COILS idrab] e gap Lhat seems 
to exist betwcen government: and cili]zeil perceptI ions of 
what rural dcvelopiment is a]l about. Before giving
specific respon.-es, it is posnible to list some recurrent 
attitudinal findings for the interviewee,, as a group: 
1. Personl paiticipation and invoLvement in 
hamlet and New Conummnity Movement affairs was hi.gh;
indeed, the natulre of the consens]us around which Korean 
hamlet life is often organLzed makes nonparticipation 
virtually an impo-'sibility. 
2. Uarmonrs colid generally dis tinguish between 
the activitie:* of the various local organizations that 
affect their lives: they knew that problems concerning 
pest control or new seed varieties were to be taken to 
the Rural. Guidance Office, and not to the coop, for 
example. All farmers, of course, depended on the coop 
at the very least for fertilizer supplies and most seemed
 
to have made some kind of financial transaction at their
 
local coop.
 
3. Farmers were well informed about developmental
 
activities through newspapers or the radio or through

speakers linking each farmhouse with the township office.
 
4. While there were many complaints about the 
demands on their time and the inequities involved in land
 
donations required for road-widening projects, most 
farmers agreed, however reluctantly, that they could see 
some positive good being derived from cooperative self­
help of the type that the New Community Movement was 
attempting to foster.
 
5. Rarely could a farmer recall being asked his
 
personal opinion on some governmental policy by a public

official; even more rarely would a farmer Volunteer his
 
opinion to anyone higher than his own hamlet.chief. (This,

of course, was a function of relative wealth and position
 
in the community.)
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6. Few farmers could frame any kind of response
 
to the question, "What should the government be doing to
 
help you that it is not already doing?" except perhaps
 
the most predictable one, "Give us more money." None
 
suggested, for example, that counties or townships should
 
have more freedco to carry out projects that are desired
 
-
by local farmeE , rather than merely respond to directives
 
from higher levels. Suggestions of this kind seem to be
 
almost unthinkable in South Korea.
 
Now let us turn to more specific responses to our
 
questions on rural development programs as they affect
 
individual farmers. It should be borne in mind that
 
these are purely random interviews and do not constitute
 
a scientific sample.
 
Farmer A: I'm the only one who has many pigs in 
our village. One day the hamlet chief showed me an 
official notice stating that if a farmer had more than 
ten pigs, the government would loan him 1I00,000. So I 
went to the Livestock Department in the town office to 
ask for money. The offici a] didn't know anything about 
it at first, but after I told him I had seen the official 
notice, he linally reitiembcred it, and in ... nrnd me, "The 
government gave(2 the province sone ]on,,y to give to farmers, 
but to qu&'Jilyv, you must have 200 pigs and complete
facil.itiec to raise pigs for export, and then you can 
receive the money!" So I asked the official if any farmer 
qualif- A.d in this county, and he replied, "No, no one. 
We sent the letter to your hamlet chief to find out if 
anyone would qual ify." 
Farmer B: The New Community Movement has its 
good point:; and bad points (a favorite Korean way of 
describing mos,tly th- bad points) . Farmers who are not 
forced to donate land to improve the roads like it. But 
farmers who los e their land don't get any compensation
from the governlment, not even ten won. Tley have families 
and they have to live. The land js their food. The 
government tells the ham)et chief not to force people to 
donate the Lr l1and, since this is a democritic country.
So he goes to the farmers and instructs them to donate 
the land. lie pleads with them every day. Final ly farmers 
make the donation. ... Tf the ProvinciaJ Governor comes 
to the vi llage, the farmers are not allowed to sleep. Some 
officials arrive in the vL1]age at dawn and order farmers 
to work on the road and clean the lanes to make a good
impression. ... There are too many public officials. 
We work hard and pay taxes for their salaries.
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Farmer C: The government wants us 
to save money.

They tell us, "Before you cook rice, 
take out a handful and 
put it aside. In a couple of months you will have savedlot of money." Everybody knows that's howa to save money.But we must sell the rice to do other tlhings, such as buy
clothes and fuel, go to the doctor, and send Lhe ch ildrento school ..The government requires the farmers Lo plant
new seed varLeCies. Parmers must obey. But .f the cropis not as large as expected, faLmers Lose not only that 
crop but also their Cime and ] and whi.ch could have been

used for other crops. Do think
you tl,e govezrnment akes
responsibility for this? No. They ignore, us. 
Farmer D: I don't like the very much. "RatC Eil1ing Campai gnWhen we buy rat poison at a d ju(- '3 Lore, i C

works very well, but when 
 we geC it from -hu (jover ment,it doesn't. The quality of the poison is poor Ind CLhe 
rats don't eat it. 
 We kill more dogs and cats than rats. 
Farmer E: I worked in the township office for
eleven years . Since now[ work in the fiedi a3 a farmer,I can better appreciate the relationship between farmers
and officials. Som times the government' s policy is; quitedifferent from farmers' real needs. ... I before anhink
official instructs a f.iimer he should learn more about
 
agricultural techniques.
 
Farmer F": We don't get enough fertilizer these
days. Even thouigh we have the money to buy it, we can't
 get it. .. The government sends a certain amount of
fertilizer to each village. We have to divide 
it up
according to 
the size of each farm. They say that the
government c:poctts fertilizer. Since the government
can export it, why don't we have enough of it? 
 I thi.nk
farmers should be able to buy fertilizer on the private

market.
 
Farmer G: In our hamlet one old farmer is very

stubborn. lie said, "If you want to take my land 
(for
the New Community Movement) then kill me 
first." 
he lay across his paddies. Then
 All the younger farmers went
to see him every day, and finally he gave up, after they
first begged and later threatened him. 
 ...The government

says that all prices are frozen at 3% above last year's.
I hear it on 
the radio every day. What about the price

of soap? It used to be W30. 
 I paid 480 for it the other
day. Some prices go up 200%--but look at the price of

rice: it stays the same. The government should not lie
 to us. Central officials snould come to a hamlet and
talk to farmers and ask them what they really want.
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When they do inspect a hamlet, the county executive
 
never takes them to a poor village. He always takes
 
them to a model hamlet to make a good impression on
 
them. After that, the model village receives more
 
assistance than the poorer villages. That's not very
 
fair.
 
Farmer H: There are too many farmers for an
 
extension worker to teach. And sometimes farmers don't
 
attend extension lectures. They think they know what
 
he will say, and they have a lot of farming experience.
 
They think it's the same old story, so perhaps 40 out
 
of 100 attend. Farmers aren't very impressed by these
 
extension agents,
 
Farmer I: The government sent cement to the hamlet
 
for the New Cormmunity Project, but it's a waste of money 
because there are no wages for the workers who repair 
roads and huild bridges. Who wants to work for free? 
So Lhe hamlet sold 50 of the 100 bags of cement to pay 
the wages of the laborers. But the government doesn't 
know about this. 
Farmer J: Our Rural Guidance worker has 200 
farmers to take care of. Sometimes I don't see him for 
months. Ile often goes to areas where farmers are growing 
special crops or where there are model vil]ages. .. .Some 
years ago, every man wanted to be the hamlet chief, for 
it was a great honor. Now no one wants to be the chief 
becau.,e evez'yone knows how hard the job is aind thci-e is 
no remune.,at on. le is insulted by the villagers if he 
doesn't do a good job, and sometimes he has to spend his 
own money for hamilet projects. lie has peihaps 20 or more 
meeting; every month, so he doesn't have time to take care 
of h is owni farrow. 
Farmoi K: I hoard that there were eight steps in 
tho New Community Movement cnd now we are at the second 
step. An ofi]c~al gave us a lecture the oth*. cbv, 
saying, "When i o reach the eighth step of Lhe nz'ti-ona 
dove] opment pro oct, we will build a big house to cook 
the meals in one place." So I guess that if it comes 
true, 1'll have to come to the vi llaje each morning with 
my family to eat brc.ilkfast. Isn't that nonsense? That's 
communism. Since we have no power we'll have to fo]low 
whatever they say. 
Farm('r L: There is a gap between the rich andthle poor_--Teri ciri cai use a New Commnity Road to carry 
their crops, but the poor lose thicir land and don't use 
the road ;o much since they don't have lar(ge crops. And 
the qovurm',,ntL said that since they gave us cement and iron 
we should work in our hamlt for free, so all the farmers 
went out to work for 50 days to build bridges and widen 
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the roads. If someone doesn't participate he must pay

a fine. If there's no provisions for fines, probably 
no one will work. Since the farmer who works for wages
can't earn any money his family will starve. So the 
poor get poorer and the- rich richer. 
Farmer M (the ]argest landowner in the township)The county okfice aLds me wiLh my livestock development
and 'the coop loaned me money to buy ]argo farming
machinery. Rural Guidance officials visit oft-en to
teach me new farming techniques. Since 1'm the only one 
in the county who runs a dairy farm, the county executive 
often visits me to encourage my efforts. L oFften go to 
the county office and the county coop. ... 'lhe Nuw 
Community Movement is really n ces:ary, erelreIy to
widen the roads, but also for our 
I-i 
spliitual developmIent.
Since the project began, the government has bu L]lt many
factories and bu±J.dings and has helped us have a btLter 
life. I think it's wonderful to be able to have such a 
nice life.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
 
In aggregate terms, South Korean farmers are
 
enjoying a more comfortable and more secure existence
 
than they were ten or twenty years ago. Yet the comments
 
(and complaints) of many farmers who talked with us during 
our field 3tudy stand as an articulate reminder of the 
danger of inferring 'real' development for individual 
farmers from aggregate statistics. Most of South Korea's 
farmers are still engaged in a day-to-day struggle against 
weather conditions, a lethargic and ponderous bureaucracy, 
and the vicissitudes of the marketplace, and seem to be 
able to do very little to control any of these. 
Turning to the questions we raised at the beginning 
of Part II, our micro-level survey of local government and 
rural development has led us to the following conclusions: 
1. South Korean farmers can probably influence 
decisions on reutine and very minor local problenms to the 
extent that the y exercise authority by virtue of personal 
wealth, kinship rela[ionships, secondary occupatoions (such 
as being a teacher or government official) and other related 
factors. But decisions on inaior policy questons are taken 
at higher level and are not subject to local approval or 
control. "Participation" in rural dovelopment proirams 
generally means responding o1)edienitly (or at least giving 
the appearance of responding obediently) to government 
programs.
 
2. Local officials are little inclined to solicit 
farmers' opinions on various government programs. The main 
reason for this is that local officials themselves have 
little say in the formulation of policy and their major 
concern is to respond to higher-level initiatives in a 
manner most- ]lkely to satisfy hi.ler-level expecta Lions. 
Of course, there is some degree of freedom to shape 
implementation procedut:cs to local condi-tions, but only 
the wealthiest and most important farmers in an area will 
exercise influence over policy implem,3ntation. 
3. The central government plans rutal development 
policy in the cortext of its overall developmental goals, 
and thus allows those goal s to determine policies for 
agriculture and rural welfare. Only in the most diffuse 
sense do central planners and policy-makers respond to 
farmers' personal needs--the major aim has been to develop 
the economy rapidly in the industrial sector with the least 
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amount of disruption to the rural sector. Only when a 
growing uneasiness among farmers manifested itself in the 
form of large numbers of miqrants from the countryside 
crowding into the urban areas did the government begin to 
take greater notice of rural conditions. Evaluation of 
new government programs leaves much to he desired as 
distortion of informaLion transmitted upwards occlrs at 
each ascending layer of the administrat ve bureaucracy 
for reasons sugested ear]ier in thi-s study. 
4. Concepts of compl, aince and participati.on are 
hard to pin down. Compliance with t.at-i.onal policy on the 
part of local offliciils is not at alL a ,;imple or strai.ght­
forward phenomenon. Local plans and 1agqeLs are srec.ifically 
set so as to g i.ve '-he iL()ea roce of compl i ance, but -he 
difference between the spi-.ril and the letter ot til filiment 
of developmental objecLives is often j reait. At Lhe sme 
time, there are some modes of popular pa.iticipition, perhaps 
better called involvement, which whi.le not whaL Westo rners 
would call "part i.cipation, " have some meaning ind effect in 
making the system function relatively smoothly. 
5. Virtijally all local problems, routine or 
extraordinary, are under cLose scrutiny at Levels higher 
than the township or even the county. Only the most minor 
infrastructural unprovement projects are hand'led entirely 
at the l.ocal level, and even these are fit d into a wider 
provincial framework. Many probl.ems of a more personal 
nature, however, are settled through informal medi ation 
channels and rarely reach formal juridical status. 
6. Rural conditions have been improving, and this 
improvement has accelerated in recent: years. All too often, 
however, "change" has occurred largely in -he phy,cal 
appearance of t:h ngs, in a direct ion that the government 
sees as more "modern," without greater attentLion gi.ven to 
chronic problems that aff]ict many farmers. Thu greatest 
single problem is the enhantcement of rural incomes, and 
as we have already pointed out, the extremely small size 
of the bulk of the farms severely restricts the capacity 
of most farmers to rely on the production of grain crops 
to improve their living standard. Diversicn of acreage 
to cash cropping to increase incomes puts an even greater 
strain on an already inadequate supply of basic food grains,
 
and no solution seems yet to have been devised that will
 
resolve this dilemma.
 
7. Farmers are not opposed to the idea of improving
 
the landscape through the construction of wider roads,
 
better dikes and dams, or new supplies of water, but many
 
resent the demands made on their time and energies for
 
projects that seem to benefit the richer farmers more than
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the poorer ones. The New Community Movement has brought
 
virtually the entire rural population within the fold of
 
national development, but this intense personal involvement
 
has not resulted in any real disaggregation of authority
 
from higher to lower levels. New Community projects are
 
drawn up and initiated at the highest levels and local
 
leaders exercise autonomy only in the limited sense of 
dividing up allocated work tasks. The Movement is largely 
devoid of any ideological content more specific than such 
vaguely-enunciLated goals as "increase incomes" or "expand 
exports." Moreover, the recruitmcnt and training of local 
Movement leaders according to centrally-deLermined standards 
cannot but enhance the control of the cenLral government 
over the lives; of ordinary farmers and leave them without 
real lccal leadership. Whether the farmers in turn will 
see any conLradicLion between the expressed goals of the 
Movement ( i.e., to encourage local initiative and self­
help in the imp] emenLation of developmental project,) and 
the methods emiployed to fulfill these goal.s remains to be 
seen. 
8. Rural local acdministrat Lou is conducted 
according to time-honored and tr td ti on-bound procedures 
that are oft en moae self-serving than public-serving. 
Without strucftitre clinq( s that : ii] incj-cie The' pressure 
on local off.iciais to be, more cccountal]( [o the people 
they are and s to hiqcijor officjia] s whoseiving u:,I (dcjInd 
strict adherenc to c.i-al dicliaLe-, theire as no l1 ]kel ihood 
that the patIe--rl of adtini'strt-ion will subt;LaCitia] ly change. 
9. "'Coordiat I as1on"ui ulilerlylng prol](m of 
admjnj.sLr-, 	 1-on IIn SouLl l1o 0,r and ini most other (vulopi ng 
s ;,umd I], L , Incountries I a r lu ,h, of "tL I c]_ic1W:." 
fact, there is o, - at dcal of djc 1 n9 anid hbrgali in(j 
at the 	 .L'v ] in ort.,in i d ij_n1ir_(.r.eo a] put1]1 a i,,I ration. 
Person ,il r1 I ;,Lt i r(2l ii t. ,(e. iTie pioblai, however, 
is not t]eo f (nsr, ity of Ln-crl e'h.clla1 con La Ls , but I. Ie i r 
JVrivk ' verru1', 1,111] 1 C no u]n(. P L i I c tic', fund;, vt'n icles, 
and ,1Lhori a virI ml ly di spo.a] ofi iclails,ty - at-iI (,d 
who wi si thii p }ullU)o PuIJJ C:u.-( for 1_ i vat( . i of f ices 
p,,_ thi uoften be come, v,o,,o0 dow,,ti n:, L. are ma pl Ia Led find 
abused i.ni a numbe:- of ways;. "Coordiliati On'" as a problem 
is only the tip of the iceberg 
10. The role of local ovcining inst it-utions in 
rural South 1,oreo ha-. bf*n to pr(-empt to the greatest 
extent po.;:f;b] the pel,onll dccthSioic, lhat fariners must 
make so as to jin,3urr, the ir continued support for the larger 
politi cal )0(1' of which they are ,I critica11 element. Any
 
roll nqui slment of c,,ntrci control would probably inLroduce
 
a degree of uncertainty and inst-ibi].ity into rural areas
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that the national leadership would find politically 
unacceptable. It i.s true that there is a national 
security problem, and that Korean farmers have tradi­
tionally been the passive instruments of the central 
elite. But these two factors notwithstanding, develop­
ment in terms of rural structural change is quite 
unlikely to be the consequence of rural local government 
as presently constituted.
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